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INTRODUCTION
Long ignored, the Export Clause' of the United States
Constitution and its ban against all taxes or duties imposed
upon exports have recently been under attack. The Supreme
Court has struggled to define the appropriate degree of respect
with which to treat the Export Clause and its command that
"[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State."2 The Court has had particular difficulty reconciling the
Export Clause's absolute ban on the taxation of exports with
Congress's broad authority to regulate commerce under the
Commerce Clause. A pair of recent Supreme Court cases,
United States v. IBM Corp.,3 and United States v. United States
Shoe Corp.,4 illustrates the Court's vacillating Export Clause
analysis.
In IBM, the Supreme Court recognized the simple, broad
and independent mandate of the Export Clause, that "[n]o Tax
or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."5 In
IBM, the Court encountered a potential conflict between the
normative values underlying the Export Clause and those un-
derlying other constitutional provisions, including the Import-
Export and Commerce Clauses.6 IBM recognized that the Ex-
port Clause and other constitutional provisions, such as the
Import-Export and Commerce Clauses, served separate pur-
poses.7 Therefore, in IBM, the Court refused to integrate Im-
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (the Export Clause).
2. Id.
3. 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
4. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
6. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause) ("The Congress shall
have the power... [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and within the Indian Tribes."); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (the
Import-Export Clause) ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports and Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws .... ").
7. The Import-Export Clause protects federal supremacy in international
commerce, preserves federal revenue from imports, and prevents an unfair
advantage from accruing to the coastal states. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 859. The
Export Clause prohibits congressional regulation of international commerce
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port-Export or Commerce Clause precedent into its Export
Clause jurisprudence.8
Shortly after issuing its decision in IBM, the Court, in U.S.
Shoe, retreated from its earlier analysis in IBM and interpreted
the Export Clause as subservient to the Commerce Clause.9
U.S. Shoe faced a conflict between the values underlying the
Export Clause and those underlying the Commerce Clause.
U.S. Shoe implicitly integrated the Commerce Clause precedent
into its Export Clause jurisprudence by acknowledging the po-
tential for a "user fee"10 exception to the Export Clause." Thus,
rather than taking the opportunity to positively define the Ex-
port Clause in light of IBM, U.S. Shoe allowed for the potential
eclipse of the Export Clause by the Commerce Clause, despite
IBM's holding. The resulting potential conflict between the
Export Clause and the Commerce Clause has re-emerged in a
series of cases already proceeding through the lower courts.' 2
This Article proposes that IBM was on its way to con-
structing a simple and straightforward analysis of the Export
Clause, which the Court should have continued in U.S. Shoe.
In its retreat from the path taken in IBM, U.S. Shoe implicitly
raised the conflict between the normative values underlying
the Export Clause and those underlying the power to impose
user fees under the Commerce Clause. U.S. Shoe seemed to in-
dicate that the conflict could be resolved simply by subjecting
the Export Clause ban to a user fee (Commerce Clause) excep-
tion. We believe that U.S. Shoe's approach was incorrect. Our
thesis is that by exposing and dissecting the normative values
through export taxes and prohibits raising revenue from exports. See id.
8. See id. at 862.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. "A user fee is a price charged by a governmental agency for a service
or product whose distribution it controls." Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D.
Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV.
795, 800 (1987).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. The exactions challenged in these cases are exactly those that fall be-
tween the facts of IBM and the facts of U.S. Shoe, and that will require a prin-
cipled and uncompromised approach. Thus, the deviation taken in U.S. Shoe
from the correct path started in IBM does not provide a foundation for a prin-
cipled decision in these future cases. New challenges, already working their
way through the lower courts may have been spurred on by the successful
challenges in IBM and U.S. Shoe. See, e.g., Ranger Fuel Corp. v. United
States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Va. 1998); Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United
States, Nos. 97-68 T, 97-310 T, 97-311 T, 97-317 T, 97-521 T, 97-522 T, 1999
U.S. Claims LEXIS 4, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 8, 1999).
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behind the Export Clause and the Commerce Clause, it be-
comes apparent that there are only a limited number of in-
stances where a true conflict exists. Further, by explicating the
Export Clause in light of its underlying values, as well as the
precedent interpreting it and its text, a clear and workable
definition of an Export Clause tax can be formulated. Once
formulated, this definition of an Export Clause tax should be
used to avoid the few instances where a conflict between the
Export Clause values and the Commerce Clause values exists.
Thus, this apparent conflict should be resolved by posi-
tively defining the textual phrase "tax or duty laid on articles
exported." More specifically, the phrase "tax or duty" should be
identified as inseparable from the modifier "laid on articles ex-
ported." Taking this definition into consideration, any Export
Clause analysis should determine whether an exaction is "laid
on articles exported." This analysis should be applied to, any
exaction that falls within the scope of "tax or duty," whether
enacted under an exercise of the Taxing Power,13 the Commerce
Clause, or both. We propose the following as a clear formula-
tion of the constitutional term "tax or duty laid on articles ex-
ported":
any exaction which:
1) arises during the process of exportation; 14 and
2) is calculated based upon the export or the process of ex-
portation. 15
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (the Taxing Power) ("The Congress shall have
Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises."). "A tax, in the
general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies
an exaction for the support of the Government." United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 61 (1936); see infra Part V.B. (discussing the meaning of "tax or duty").
14. See infra Part V.B. For a tax to be prohibited by the Export Clause,
the article which it burdens must begin the process of exportation either le-
gally or temporally. See A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69-70
(1923) (holding that a general property tax laid upon baseball bats within the
course of exportation violates the constitutional prohibition); Turpin v. Bur-
gess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886) (holding that a general tax laid upon all ciga-
rettes, not levied on the cigarettes in the course of exportation, does not violate
the constitutional prohibition); United States v. Gosho Co., 23 F.2d 675, 676
(5th Cir. 1928) (stating that a transportation tax applied to cotton in the proc-
ess of exportation, though temporarily stopped, violated the Export Clause).
15. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 312 (1901) (stating that
an exaction upon bills of lading taxed exports directly); Pace v. Burgess, 92
U.S. 372, 375 (1875) (holding that a stamp to be affixed to exported tobacco
was not a tax because it bore no proportion whatsoever to the quantity or
value of the package to which it was affixed).
[Vol184:129
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We believe this definition promotes the values embodied in
the Export Clause. Although a conflict may arise between the
values sought to be promoted by each clause, we believe that
nothing in the Export Clause or its history indicates that the
conflict should result in an Export Clause standard that ren-
ders the Export Clause subservient to the Commerce Clause.
In fact, we argue that in the few instances where a conflict ex-
ists, it can be eradicated by modifying the proposed exaction
(within the parameters of the powers under the Commerce
Clause). Thus, we submit that our proposed definition can
serve as a guide to avoid potential conflicts between the two
clauses.
Part I explores IBM's rejection of Import-Export and
Commerce Clause precedent to construct a comprehensive defi-
nition of the Export Clause, leading to U.S. Shoe's unceremoni-
ous adoption of a user fee exception to the Export Clause. The
user fee exception adopted in U.S. Shoe undermines the ap-
proach started by the Court in IBM and will cause confusion in
the future. That is, one could imagine a suit challenging exac-
tions that were nominally, or perhaps even actually, 16 user fees,
enacted pursuant to Congress's Commerce Power rather than
under the Taxing Power, but that would otherwise offend the
Export Clause. 17 In addition, a conflict could arise in cases
where an exaction is an exercise of concurrent Taxing and
Commerce Powers. 18 Thus, we argue, the approach taken by
16. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943)
(holding that imposing penalties for producing cotton over the quota amount
does not violate the taxing power, it regulates commerce pursuant to the
commerce power).
17. The Supreme Court recently recognized the danger of a nominal con-
stitutional compliance in IBM, where the question involved whether a chal-
lenged tax was "on the goods" so as to implicate the Export Clause. See
United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 879 (1995).
The protections of the Export Clause must extend, perhaps, some-
what beyond specific taxes on goods, for "[i]f it meant no more than
that, the obstructions to exportation which it was the purpose to pre-
vent could readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming to
the constitutional restriction but in effect overriding it."
Id. (quoting United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 13 (1914)).
18. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 154 B.R. 416, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), affd, 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is considerable reason to be-
lieve that Congress intended such obligations... to be exercises of both pow-
ers [commerce and taxing powers] simultaneously."). In Chateaugay, the court
recognized that whether the Coal Act was enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, to the Taxing Power, or to both, directly affects its application. See id.
1999]
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the Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe may endanger principled deci-
sions in Export Clause challenges to come.
Part II examines the values underlying the Export Clause
and the Commerce Clause. We examine the economic and po-
litical justifications for maintaining a consistent and independ-
ent Export Clause standard. Many of the Framers' concerns
regarding the protection of geographical regions and the avoid-
ance of political bargaining exist today or can be easily analo-
gized to modern concerns. 19 Nevertheless, it may be argued
that the efficiencies promoted by user fees outweigh Export
Clause values. Therefore, we identify the efficiencies of user
fees as well as other motivations behind such fees. Part III re-
views the Export Clause precedent and compares it with rele-
vant Commerce Clause and Import-Export Clause precedent,
examining how respective case law addressed the normative
values underlying these clauses. The review of the precedent
casts doubt upon U.S. Shoe's Commerce Clause analysis that
distinguished a user fee exception, i.e., taxes enacted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause that are not subject to the Export
Clause.
Part IV examines the possible meaning of the Export
Clause as evidenced by different interpretative approaches.
Textual, normative and historical approaches are considered
and are found to support the independence of the Export
Clause. Finally, Part V proposes a formulation of an Export
Clause standard that supports the values underlying the Ex-
port Clause and is consistent with Export Clause text and
precedent.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S VACILLATING EXPORT
CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has vacillated in interpreting the Ex-
port Clause. In IBM, the Court found that the Export Clause
was a broad unqualified prohibition against any and all exac-
tions laid upon exports by the federal government. Two terms
later in U.S. Shoe, the Court signaled an exception to the Ex-
port Clause-user fees. In IBM, the Court refused to incorpo-
rate non-Export Clause precedent to examine the nature of the
burden imposed in an Export Clause analysis.20 On the other
19. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
20. 517 U.S. at 852-57. "We have good reason to hesitate before adopting
the analysis of our recent Import-Export Clause cases into our Export Clause
[Vol 84:129
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hand, in U.S. Shoe, despite its protests to the contrary, the
Court implicitly incorporated non-Export Clause precedent
when it looked beyond the text and characterized the nature of
the exaction placed upon exports.21
A. THE IBM APPROACH
In IBM Corp. v. United States,22 the Court of Federal
Claims (C.F.C.) explicitly followed the long line of earlier Ex-
port Clause cases. The court refused to examine the nature of
the tax and held that the proper inquiry under the Export
Clause is only whether the tax is so "closely related to the 'pro-
cess of exporting' that it falls within the constitutional prohibi-
tion.23 The court specifically rejected an analysis which would
require it to incorporate Import-Export Clause precedent. 24
In IBM, plaintiff, IBM, was a developer and manufacturer
of sophisticated information processing systems. Between the
years 1975-1984, IBM sold its products made in the United
States and overseas throughout a worldwide sales network.
IBM shipped products from the United States to the foreign
customer by truck and on common carrier. Typically during
transit within the United States, the products would be un-
loaded at intermediate freight locations, awaiting air transpor-
tation and finally, the products would be exported to the foreign
country.25 Title and risk of loss passed when the merchandise
cleared customs in the foreign country. "The terms of sale also
called for the purchasing subsidiary to bear the cost of insuring
the products against damage or destruction during shipment."26
jurisprudence... [because] textual differences exist and should not be over-
looked." Id. at 857.
21. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998).
"The [Export] Clause, however, does not rule out a 'user fee,' provided that the
fee [is] ... a charge designed as compensation for government-supplied serv-
ices, facilities, or benefits." Id. Any understanding of a "user fee" cannot be
derived from the Export Clause, as user fees are exactions authorized by the
Commerce Power. Thus, the Court incorporates Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence to delineate a permissible exception to the Export Clause.
22. 31 Fed. Cl. 500 (1994), affd, 59 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 843 (1996).
23. Id. at 503 (quoting Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United
States, 237 U.S. 19, 25 (1915)).
24. See id. at 506.
25. See id. at 501.
26. Id.
1999]
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All IBM United States-made products sold to foreign sub-
sidiaries were covered by "point to point" casualty insurance. 27
When IBM filed its federal excise tax returns, it "did not report
any liability under § 4371 of the Internal Revenue Code,' 28 a
tax provision that levies "a four percent excise tax on premiums
paid for certain policies of insurance issued by foreign insur-
ers."29 An IRS audit concluded that IBM was liable for the §
4371 tax.
As part of the audit, IBM requested that the Internal
Revenue Service's District Director seek advice from the Na-
tional Office on whether § 4371 as applied to IBM's exports,
violated the Export Clause. The National Office found that the
§ 4371 exaction was not a tax within the meaning of the Export
Clause because the primary object of the tax was regulatory
and not revenue-raising. 30 On reconsideration the Service is-
sued a Second Technical Advice Memorandum arguing that
"the Export Clause did not restrict application of the § 4371 tax
because the incurred risks included some transportation within
the United States."31 When the case came before the C.F.C.,
the government abandoned both positions put forth by the
Service.3 2
In its challenge in the C.F.C., IBM argued that § 4371 was
a tax specifically prohibited by the Export Clause because it
was a revenue-raising measure. 33 Its predecessor was "a stamp
tax enacted as part of a comprehensive wartime revenue bill,
the Revenue Act of 1918."34 Further, the legislative history in-
dicated that the tax's purpose was to raise revenue: "It is be-
lieved that the revised provision will yield an appreciable
amount of revenue, and at the same time eliminate an unwar-
ranted competitive advantage now favoring foreign insurers
[who are not subject to income tax]."35 IBM put forth that the
Export Clause protects merchandise from all taxes once in the
27. The insurance covers "risk of loss to goods during transportation by
surface or air transportation from the IBM facility in the United States until
delivered to the foreign customer or a foreign consolidation center." Id.
28. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 4371).
29. Id. at 502.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 504.
33. See id. at 503.
34. Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1107, 40 Stat. 1057, 1135-38,
repealed by 42 Stat. 321 (1921)).
35. Id. at 503-04 (citing H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 61 (1942)).
[Vol 84:129
EXPORT CLAUSE
export stream, and that the export stream starts the minute
the goods begin continuous journey out of the country.36
IBM relied on an earlier Export Clause case, Thames &
Mersey Marine Insurance, Co. v. United States,37 which held
that the Export Clause prohibited taxes on marine insurance
policies for exports.38 The government, in IBM, sought to in-
validate the part of the holding of Thames & Mersey which
banned all taxes on the process of exportation. On appeal, the
court of appeals examined whether the 1915 decision in
Thames & Mersey was still good law.39 The court of appeals af-
firmed the continuing vitality of Thames & Mersey by recount-
ing the Supreme Court's Import-Export Clause decisions and
by distinguishing the language and policy implications of the
Import-Export and the Commerce Clause with those of the Ex-
port Clauses.40 Nevertheless, the court's analysis added little
to the substance of Export Clause understanding other than to
distinguish it from that of Import-Export Clause understand-
ing.
At the Supreme Court level, significant analysis came in
Justice Thomas's majority opinion in IBM. The government
again contended that the intervening shift in the approach to
Commerce Clause and Import-Export Clause cases required a
similar shift in Export Clause analysis. Justice Thomas noted
that:
Our decades-long struggle over the meaning of the nontextual nega-
tive command of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead to the
conclusion that our interpretation of the textual command of the Ex-
port Clause is equally fluid.... These textual disparities strongly
suggest that shifts in the Court's view of the scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause should not, and indeed cannot, govern our interpre-
tation of the Export Clause.4'
Justice Thomas set aside the question of whether a tax on poli-
cies insuring exports was a "tax on exports" by stating that the
government had not chosen to challenge that aspect of Thames
36. See id. at 504; see also Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. 734, 752 (1978) (explaining the export
stream argument).
37. 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
38. See id. at 27.
39. See IBM Corp. v. United States, 59 F.3d 1234, 1235-38 (Fed. Cir.
1995), affd, 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
40. See id. at 1238.
41. United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 851-52 (1996).
19991 137
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& Mersey.42 Justice Thomas was then only faced with the
problem of whether the absolute prohibition of Thames & Mer-
sey was still good law in light of more recent Import-Export
Clause cases.43 In reviewing the Export Clause precedent, his
opinion stated:
At the same time we were defining a domain within which nondis-
criminatory taxes could permissibly be imposed on goods intended for
export, we were also making clear that the Export Clause strictly
prohibits any tax or duty, discriminatory or not, that falls on exports
during the course of exportation.44
The Court relied on the rule of stare decisis, refusing to adopt
the Import-Export Clause analysis,45 which focused primarily
upon whether a tax was discriminatory, without some indica-
tion that the Export Clause addressed the same issues to which
the Import-Export Clause was directed.
B. THE U.S. SHOE APPROACH
Shortly after the decision in IBM, the Court faced another
Export Clause challenge in United States v. United States Shoe
Corp.46 In U.S. Shoe, the lower courts and the Supreme Court
considered an exaction which fell directly on the exports and
could not be disguised as anything other than an exercise of the
Taxing Power. The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT), as en-
acted, was assessed on the importation, exportation, domestic
movement of cargo and admission of cargo into foreign trade
zones.47 When goods were exported from the United States, the
exporter was liable for payment of the HMT. The HMT was
calculated upon the legally declared value of the shipment
loaded, i.e., on an ad valorem basis. 48
U.S. Shoe Corporation sought to invalidate the HMT,
claiming it was a tax levied on exports, and therefore, violated
the Export Clause. U.S. Shoe argued that the plain language of
the HMT, its legislative history, its substance, purpose and
structure demonstrated that the HMT was clearly a tax im-
42. See id. at 854-55.
43. See id. at 857.
44. Id. at 848.
45. See infra Part III.C. (discussing the Import-Export Clause analysis of
whether an exaction is an impost or duty).
46. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
47. See I.R.C. §§ 4461-62 (West Supp. 1999).
48. See 15 C.F.R. § 30.7 (1999). The value declared on the Shipper's Ex-
port Declaration or other pertinent documentation represented the free along-
side sale price of the merchandise, which is one measurement of the value of
the goods.
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posed by Congress through its Taxing Power. Therefore, U.S.
Shoe argued that the HMT violated the Export Clause's abso-
lute prohibition on the assessment of taxes or duties on articles
exported from any state in the United States.49
Given that the HMT was arguably a Taxing Power exac-
tion nominally disguised as a user fee, U.S. Shoe simply argued
that the exaction, as an exercise of the Taxing Power, violated
the Export Clause without question. This strategy evolved in
part out of the government's argument that the HMT was a
valid user fee.50 U.S. Shoe had such a strong argument that
the HMT was not a valid user fee that there was little incentive
to argue that even a valid user fee was subject to the prohibi-
tion under the Export Clause.51
Nevertheless, U.S. Shoe did argue that even if the courts
did not find that the HMT was enacted under the Taxing
Power, the Export Clause was intended by the Framers-and
stands to this day-as an absolute bar to any burden placed
upon exports, regardless of its enactment under a particular
legislative intent of Congress, its possible nondiscriminatory
effects or its nominal characterization as a user fee.52 Thus,
U.S. Shoe and amici argued that the substance of the exaction,
rather than any superficial attempts at its recharacterization
under another Constitutional Power, should be the basis for de-
termining whether it was a tax on exports. 53 The lower courts'
49. See Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment
at 22-46, United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995) (No. 94-11-00668, 95-173) [hereinafter Plaintiffs C.I.T. Brief].
50. The government rebuked U.S. Shoe's claim that the HMT was an ex-
ercise of the Taxing Power and thus subject to the Export Clause. Rather, the
government argued that the HMT was a legitimate and appropriate attempt
by Congress to enact a "fee for services" pursuant to its authority under the
Commerce Clause. See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment at 31-32, United States Shoe Corp. v. United
States, 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (No. 94-11-00668, 95-173). The
government assumed, and the Court did not disagree, that if its characteriza-
tion of the HMT as a Commerce Clause exaction was upheld, no further Ex-
port Clause analysis would be required. See id. at 39.
51. At all times, the Act refers to the HMT as a "tax," and it was specifi-
cally listed as an "excise tax" within the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §
4461.
52. See Plaintiffs C.I.T. Brief, supra note 49, at 25-35.
53. See id. In a scheduling order dated February 25, 1995, the Court of
International Trade allowed certain plaintiffs having HMT cases pending in
the court at that time to participate in this litigation as amicus curiae. Thus,
numerous attorneys filed briefs on behalf of various amici arguing, in most
cases, the same theories.
1999]
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decisions however, did not reach the latter argument stated
above. Instead, the courts concluded, for a variety of reasons,
that the purpose and effect of the Act was clearly that of levy-
ing a tax.54 Beyond merely identifying the HMT as a tax, how-
ever, the Court of International Trade (C.I.T.) analyzed the
Commerce Clause argument put forth by the government. The
court concluded "there is little indication that Congress in-
tended to establish a user fee."55 The C.I.T. examined the leg-
islative history of the HMT, which evidenced that Congress ac-
tively sought finding of harbor projects it clearly intended to
undertake.5 6 The reality that the HMT was not a user fee
seemed to be recognized by Congress when it enacted the HMT,
as the Senate stated that the tax in title 8 is not on the harbor,
nor is it on the vessel's operator or owner. The tax is set on the
value of the cargo, and is to be paid by the owner of the cargo,
or his agent.57 This statement revealed the tax as one placed
upon the exported merchandise itself, not upon harbor use by
vessel operators or owners.58
54. Among the bases for finding that the HMT was clearly a tax was
HMT's revenue raising purpose. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United
States, 907 F. Supp. 408, 412-13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995), affd, 114 F.3d 1534
(Fed. Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 360 (1998). The finding that the HMT was a
revenue-raiser was based, at least in part, on the fact that the HMT was a tax
on the sale of goods and the value of those goods, and as such, bore no relation
to the cost of port maintenance. See id. at 411. The HMT did not differentiate
among port users in order to quantify the services rendered to each user so as
to constitute a fee reimbursing the cost of services provided. In fact, the HMT
statute and regulations provided for special exemptions from payment of the
HMT. For example, intra-port movements of merchandise were exempt under
the HMT statute and regulations. Also, exportations from the continental
United States to Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. possessions were exempt from the
HMT. See I.R.C. § 4462(b); 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(c)(i)(A) (1999). Moreover, the
proceeds collected in excess of the outlays spent on maintaining the harbors,
qualified under the Act as general revenue for sundry government purposes
and overall deficit reduction. See 141 CONG. REC. E519 (daily ed. March 6,
1995) (statement of Rep. McDermott); see also I.R.C. § 9505(c)(3).
55. United States Shoe Corp., 907 F. Supp. at 414.
56. See id.
57. See S. REP. NO. 99-126, at 6647 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-A.N.
6639, 6647.
58. The Government asserted that by "imposing the [HMT] on an ad valo-
rem basis," Congress correlated the amount of the fee to the benefits received;
"Congress rationally concluded that shippers of higher value cargo would re-
ceive greater benefits (e.g., greater profits) from the [ability to transport cargo
of higher value.]" Petitioner's Brief at 28, United States v. United States Shoe
Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998) (No. 97-372), available in 1997 WL 772730, at *47
(Dec. 15, 1997). Thus, the government claimed it met the National Cable
Television standard for a tax as being based solely on property and income,
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The analysis of these issues performed by the C.I.T. was
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(C.A.F.C.) in full. And, although the C.A.F.C. affirmed the su-
premacy of the Commerce Clause in its analysis 59 and invali-
dated the HMT, it also acknowledged the potential conflict be-
tween a Commerce Clause analysis and an Export Clause
analysis, stating: "the power to regulate commerce cannot com-
pletely override the effect of the Export Clause."60
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decisions of the C.I.T.
and the C.A.F.C. in U.S. Shoe, rhetorically retreated from the
lower courts' analyses, which focused on determining whether
Congress had enacted an exaction pursuant to the Commerce
Clause or the Taxing Power.61 The Court claimed to reject this
approach because it was based on the use of precedent which
did not involve the Export Clause. 62 In addition, it seemed to
reject the fluid interpretations applied to the Commerce
Clause, stating: "the Court reasoned in IBM, '[olur decades-long
struggle over the meaning of the nontextual negative command
of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead to the conclu-
sion that our interpretation of the textual command of the Ex-
port Clause is equally fluid."'63
and not on any benefit received. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974).
59. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 114 F.3d 1564, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
60. Id. at 1575 (citing North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704-05 (1946))
("This is not to say, of course, that Congress is an absolute sovereign. It is
limited by express provisions in other parts of the Constitution, such as sec-
tion 9 of Article I and the Bill of Rights.").
The power of Congress over commerce... is not restricted, except as
the Constitution expressly provides .... For example, the provisions
of Article I, § 9, forbidding the giving of preferences "by any Regula-
tion of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another;" and commanding that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Arti-
cles exported from any State."
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Ins. Comm'r, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946).
61. "The government's reliance [on] various 'user fee' cases is misplaced as
those 'decisions involved constitutional provisions other than the Export
Clause, however, and thus do not govern here." United States v. United
States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 368 (1998).
62. See id. at 367-68 (citing United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52
(1989); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978);
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707 (1972)).
63. Id. at 368 (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 851
(1996)).
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Nevertheless, despite restraining itself to an Export
Clause-only line of precedent, and rejecting a fluid interpreta-
tive methodology, the Court was still able to find a user fee ex-
ception to the Export Clause. The Court stated: "The Clause,
however, does not rule out a user fee, provided that the fee
lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and is,
instead, a charge designed as compensation for govern-
ment-supplied services, facilities, or benefits."64 The Court was
able to find a user fee exception despite its rhetorical rejection
of Commerce Clause precedent by finding it within Export
Clause precedent itself, specifically within Pace v. Burgess.65 In
Pace, the Court had rejected an Export Clause challenge to a
charge for a stamp affixed to packages of tobacco, where the
charge for the stamp bore no relationship whatsoever to the
quantity or value of the package to which it was affixed.66 The
U.S. Shoe Court concluded that "[t]he guiding precedent for de-
termining what constitutes a bona fide user fee in the Export
Clause context remains our time-tested decision in Pace."
67
Thus, the Court appears to have carved out a Commerce Clause
user fee exception to the Export Clause, despite claims to the
contrary.
It is our contention that the Court's claim of a user fee ex-
ception found in direct Export Clause precedent, and not de-
rived from Commerce Clause precedent, is incorrect as it fails
to recognize the conceptual genealogy of the user fee concept.
68
Thus, although the Court nominally rejected direct Commerce
Clause precedent, it still utilized it by employing the mode of
thinking created in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Prior
to the introduction of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence spe-
cifically raised by the government in U.S. Shoe, and addressed
by the C.I.T. and C.A.F.C., no concept of a user fee exception
had been, or would have been, read into Pace v. Burgess. In
64. Id. at 363.
65. 92 U.S. 372 (1875). However, this is exactly where the Court strayed
from its claim of rejecting Commerce Clause precedent and adhering to Export
Clause precedent. The Court's reading of a user fee exception into Pace, where
it had not previously existed, is a reinterpretation of Pace based on modes of
thinking created subsequent to that case in the Commerce Clause precedent
which the Court was claiming to reject.
66. See id. at 375-76.
67. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. at 369.
68. For an understanding of the history of user fees, see Suellen M. Wolfe,
Municipal Finance and the Commerce Clause: Are User Fees the Next Target of
the "Silver Bullet"?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 727, 765-73 (1997).
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fact, the Court began correctly by rejecting Commerce Clause
precedent in U.S. Shoe, but then erred in attempting to locate a
Commerce Clause concept in Export Clause precedent. Thus,
the Court in U.S. Shoe contradicted its own explicitly stated in-
tention to exclude Commerce Clause precedent. By doing so,
the Court merely kept the debate within the tax/user fee di-
chotomy created in Commerce Clause precedent.
This Article contends that both Export Clause and Com-
merce Clause precedent prove that this tax/user fee dichotomy
is irrelevant, misleading, and incorrect when applied to Export
Clause cases. This erroneous approach assumes a Commerce
Clause-based dichotomy between tax and user fee, and then as-
serts that "user fees" should be exempt from the Export Clause
"tax" prohibition. However, this approach begs the question of
how to determine the standard for distinguishing a user fee
from a tax or duty under the Export Clause, and assumes the
utility of making this distinction. We shall address these is-
sues, arguing that continuing with the Commerce Clause mode
of thinking is both incorrect and not useful in analyzing Export
Clause cases. The creation of a user fee exception contradicts
the approach to Export Clause interpretation adopted in IBM,
and the explicitly stated intent of the Court in U.S. Shoe of es-
chewing Commerce Clause precedent. Also, it contradicts the
values and text of the Export Clause, while creating more
problems for interpretation in future cases.
II. POLICY ISSUES UNDERLYING THE EXPORT CLAUSE
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DEBATE
Although not undertaken by the Court in either IBM or
U.S. Shoe, a review of the policy issues underlying the Export
Clause and the Commerce Clause helps to understand how
these clauses can-and should-be interpreted with respect to
each other. It is only by examining the underlying political
aims, and the conflicts between them, that a coherent policy
can be derived. The Export Clause, as a broad ban against any
tax or duty "laid on Articles exported from any State,"69 fosters
the uniform protection of exports in order to encourage United
States industry and exportation and to promote fairness in na-
tional policies towards the states.70 That is, by removing ex-
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
70. See JAMES' MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498-500 (Adrienne Koch ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
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ports as possible ammunition in the arsenal of government
fund-raising, and therefore removing their potential as a politi-
cal bargaining tool, U.S. competitiveness on an international
plane is protected from domestic political intervention.71 Thus,
a uniform, clear, and absolute ban on exactions on exports dis-
courages Congressional attempts to find loopholes in the Ex-
port Clause, which would needlessly undermine the foregoing
goals.
On the other hand, the relevant Commerce Clause policies
are those that have, in the development of its jurisprudence,
created a fairer or more useful method of government exac-
tion.72 These exactions are distinguished from general taxation
by the greater fairness and utility in the use of the funds gen-
erated.73 However, these values are not sufficient to make the
tax/user fee dichotomy helpful in the Export Clause analysis.
The application of any exaction at all on exported goods, re-
gardless of its greater fairness and utility, still runs afoul of the
underlying purpose of the Export Clause. In addition, certain
other values promoted by user fees, such as revenue-
enhancement, are clearly contrary to the values promoted by
the Export Clause.74 The Export Clause was explicitly enacted
to prevent exports from being a source of revenue, due to their
sensitive political nature.75 Thus, altering the form of an exac-
tion (from tax to user fee) to promote values of fairness, utility,
or revenue enhancement does not negate the nature of the ex-
actions as contrary to the underlying values of the Export
Clause.
Finally, although the values promoted by a user fee dis-
tinction do not overcome the need to preserve the underlying
values embodied by the broad construction of the Export
Clause, the values behind user fees can be served by identifying
cases where the two values do not conflict. Where there is a
conflict, an accommodation can be achieved by properly con-
structing user fees to avoid offense of the Export Clause. Spe-
cifically, by observing the limit of application of the Export
1987).
71. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 292 (1901).
72. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text (describing the alloca-
tion of cost for goods and services provided by the government).
73. See Wolfe, supra note 68, at 786-87.
74. "[T]he purpose of the restriction is that exportation, all exportation,
shall be free from national burden." Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292.
75. See id.
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Clause only to exactions "laid on Articles exported," appropriate
fiscal relief promoting the values of utility and fairness can still
be achieved outside the reach of the Export Clause.
A. THE VALUES SUPPORTED BY THE EXPORT CLAUSE
The Export Clause's complete ban on all exactions laid on
exports serves several important goals. It encourages industry
and competition by removing government interference in mar-
ket forces by way of taxation.7 6 It protects exports as a vital
component of international trade. 7 It reduces the export in-
dustry's vulnerability to political bargaining.78
The qualified scope of the Export Clause set forth by the
Court in U.S. Shoe endangers the uniform protection of exports
envisioned by the Framers. James Madison reported that the
Constitution's Framers insisted on a complete ban against
taxes on exports in part due to concerns that such taxes would
discourage industry and would prevent taxation uniformity as
a result of differing produce among the States.79 In fact, the
Framers were acutely aware of the possible long-term implica-
tions of the Export Clause, yet still chose to adopt it in its
broadest form. At the Convention of 1787, a series of proposals
to limit the breadth and severity of the Export Clause were
specifically rejected.80 One of these proposals-to restrict the
Export Clause's application only to taxes whose purpose was
raising revenue-was rejected, suggesting that interpretation
of the Export Clause should not produce this effect.8 ' Most in-
terestingly, another proposal directly addressed the issue pre-
sented over 200 years later in U.S. Shoe. The proposal, which
was considered and rejected, suggested that Congress limit the
Export Clause's scope in case regulation of exports was deemed
necessary by Congress.8 2
76. See id. at 292-93.
77. See id. at 291.
78. See id. at 292.
79. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 498. Additionally, the Export Clause
was intended to give the Southern States assurance that the Northern States,
through their power in the federal government, would not impose a burden of
taxation on the Southern States.
80. See id. at 499-503.
81. See id. at 501.
82. See id. at 499-500. Other proposals considered and rejected included
requests for exemption of enumerated articles from export taxes and provi-
sions for imposition of an export tax subject to a super-majority vote of Con-
gress. See id. at 499-503. "The power of taxing exports may be inconvenient
1999]
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More importantly, at a time when globalization encourages
states to compete more efficiently, the possible subservience of
the Export Clause shield to a Commerce Clause user fee may
distort the United States' comparative advantage83 in any par-
ticular industry. User fees placed upon exports add a cost to
exports while creating a cross subsidy for some other good or
service.84 The ability of United States exports to compete effi-
ciently in world markets directly affects the domestic econ-
omy.85
Moreover, the Court's failure to recognize the clear inde-
pendence of the Export Clause from the Commerce Clause
threatens the safety of exports from political bargaining at the
federal level. The Export Clause was enacted due to the very
specific and real concern the Framers from the Southern States
had that the Northern States might unduly burden exports.
86
The South's economy relied on exports. 87 Although the precise
geographic rivalries may not exist today, new ones do.88 Like-
at present; but it must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit it with respect
to all articles and for ever." Id. at 499.
83. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 347, 349-58 (1998) (outlining the efficiency model of trade and
critiquing its application to linkage issues). "The theory of comparative ad-
vantage teaches that, in the absence of trade restrictions, each nation will spe-
cialize in the production and export of goods and services that it can produce
relatively more efficiently than other nations." Id. at 350. See generally
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(1965) (detailing the theory of comparative advantage).
84. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 815. A cross subsidy occurs
when a user fee "falls short of the cost of the service they receive, [shifting] a
burden.., onto other segments ofsociety." Id. It follows that a fair user fee,
i.e., one that accurately reflects the cost of an individual's use of a service,
permits a service to be provided free of subsidy. See id.; infra Part II.B.
85. See The International Trade Administration (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http'//www.ita.doc.gov> (providing access to trade information and govern-
mental services). See generally ANDREW B. BERNARD & J. BRADFORD JENSEN,
EXPORTING AND PRODUCTIVITY (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. W7135, 1999) (discussing whether exporting plays a role in in-
creasing productivity or reallocating resources in the United States manufac-
turing industry); World Merchandise Exports Seen Rising, J. COM., July 7,
1999, at 6 (discussing the United States' economic growth as parallel to the
growth of United States' exports).
86. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 498.
87. See id.
88. See generally Brenda S. Beerman, State Involvement in the Promotion
of Export Trade: Is it Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as it Pertains
to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 187, 189-93 (1995)
(comparing U.S. state and regional exports, U.S. national exports, and exports
of international powers); see also U.S. Export Sales Reports (visited Feb. 25,
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wise, industry rivalries exist as well. Although the characteri-
zation of a fee, as known today, might not have existed at the
Constitutional Convention, a modification of the general prohi-
bition which would have allowed for fees was raised and re-
jected at that time.89 The potential for political bargaining with
federal exactions based upon geographic or industry prefer-
ences exists today as it did when the Constitution was writ-
ten.90
Finally, the Court's vacillating approach to Export Clause
interpretation leaves the lower courts, as well as Congress, un-
guided and perhaps even misguided regarding the scope of the
Export Clause protection. Certainty in judicial decisions can
almost always be cited as a reason to support one interpreta-
tion or another. However, in this case it is clear that the Ex-
port Clause prohibits all taxes or duties laid upon exports,
whether or not those exactions are nominally called a tax or a
fee. Focusing a definition upon whether the exaction offends
the Export Clause vis-h-vis its relationship to the exported arti-
cles, rather than by means of identifying the nature of the exac-
tion, will avoid the likely attempt of Congress to circumvent the
scope of the Export Clause by constructing nominal fees or
other exactions. A true charge for service can always be based
upon the service as an alternative to basing the charge on the
export.9 '
Thus, the goals of the Export Clause are simply to protect
exports and to keep political or geographical jockeying out of in-
ternational trade. Carving out a user fee exception to the Ex-
port Clause undermines these goals and, as will be discussed
1999) <http://www.fas.usda.gov/export-sales/esrdl.html> (demonstrating the
position of certain agricultural commodities over others). For statistical in-
formation on exporting states, see The Office of Trade and Economic Analysis
(visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http//www.ita.doc.gov/industry/utea/state>.
89. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 499-500. Madison's suggestion that
"[a] proper regulation of exports may & probably will be necessary hereafter,
and for the same purposes as the regulation of imports; viz, for revenue-do-
mestic manufactures-and procuring equitable regulations from other na-
tions" was ultimately disregarded in favor of a complete prohibition of taxes on
exports. Id.
90. During oral arguments, the U.S. Shoe Court discussed Congress's
failure to enact a tonnage rather than a value-based tax, implying that the de-
cision was at least in part influenced by Senator Hatfield, whom Justice Scalia
remarked hailed from the great timber state of Oregon. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998)
(No. 97-372), available in 1998 WL 102578, at *8-9 (Mar. 4, 1998).
91. Id. at *8-10.
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below, is not necessary to preserve the goals fostered by the
Commerce Clause.
B. THE VALUES SUPPORTED BY THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
THE BASIS FOR USER FEES
The creation of a user fee as distinct from a tax in Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is based on promoting policies such
as utility, fairness, and revenue enhancement.9 2 User fees as
payments based on direct measurable consumption of service
can be used to further economic utility.93 They are benefit-
based charges that, generally speaking, foster the efficient allo-
cation of goods and services controlled by the government.94
Typically the government undertakes to provide a service be-
cause the market has failed or will fail to do so for a variety of
reasons.9 5  As Professors Gillette and Hopkins point out,
"[tihese market failures may be attributable to the existence of
public goods, substantial externalities, information or immo-
bility problems, or natural monopolies."96 Alternatively, user
fees may be imposed not to rectify a market failure, but rather
to promote a separate governmental objective. Alternative gov-
ernment objectives include "fairness, revenue enhancement,
and privatization."97
Professors Gillette and Hopkins indicate that user fees are
appropriate when, because of these market failures, a govern-
ment charge based upon use will "foster a more efficient alloca-
tion of goods and services."98 A market failure may occur be-
cause the good or service is a "public good," i.e., street lighting
or national defense. 99 A public good is nonrival (use by one
party does not encroach upon use by another) and nonexclud-
able (use cannot be prohibited).'0 ° Where a good is a public
92. See generally Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 799.
93. See generally id. at 795; Wolfe, supra note 68, at 786.
94. For our understanding of the goals behind user fees we rely on the
writings of Gillette and Hopkins. See generally Gillette & Hopkins, supra note
10, at 795.
95. See id. at 800-01.
96. Id. at 800.
97. Id. at 813.
98. Id. at 800.
99. See id. at 801-02.
100. See id. at 801; see also Terrence J. Schroepfer, Fee-Based Incentives
and the Efficient Use of Spectrum, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 414 (1992) (ex-
plaining the user fee theory in order to evaluate the efficiency of user fees pro-
posed by the Federal Communications Commission).
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good the market will be hesitant to provide the service because
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to profit.101 Further, user
fees may provide for the efficient allocation of information
(which itself is a public good).10 2
The market also fails where there are externalities. Sim-
ply put, externalities are costs or benefits which accrue to third
parties not involved in the transaction. 03 The government may
impose a user fee to subsidize a good or service which has posi-
tive externalities or to penalize a good or service which has
negative externalities. 10 4 Accounting for externalities is most
efficient as it reveals the true cost of any good or service. 105
Likewise, user fees may be used to control monopolies (which
have a variety of externalities).10 6
As Professors Gillette and Hopkins explain, user fees may
also serve goals other than the efficient allocation of resources,
namely: fairness, revenue enhancement or rationalization. 107
"[Tihe fairness issue... [involves the evaluation of] whether,
for any given program, a user fee is a suitable means to lessen
burdens that otherwise would be borne by taxpayers who de-
rive little or no benefit from the service." 08 Similarly, revenue
enhancement seeks to decrease the burden on the general
revenue for services provided by the government.109 User fees
may also serve to invite competition for government services to
determine whether a market failure truly does exists." 0 A user
fee for a government service erodes the protection of that serv-
ice and encourages the market to supply the service. If the
market can supply the service, government supply will no
longer be needed because the market will be the most efficient
supplier of the resources (assuming no significant external-
ities).
Nevertheless, a user fee is not always appropriate when
the government provides a service. For example, sometimes
the cost of the good does not increase with increased usage, i.e.,
101. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 802.
102. See id. at 804.
103. See id. at 803.
104. See id. at 803-04.
105. See id. at 803.
106. See id. at 804.
107. See id. at 799.
108. Id. at 814.
109. See id. at 818.
110. See id. at 821.
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there is no marginal cost. Where the service is a public good it
is a nonrival good, and thus, its marginal cost is zero making
any approximation of use charge difficult, if not impossible."'
However, a user fee may be appropriate where a good is nonri-
val and excludable or rival and nonexcludable. 112 In either
case, the good is neither a purely public good (which is best
provided for by the general revenue) nor a purely private good
(which is best provided for by the market place). Thus, as one
commentator has noted user fees are most appropriate when
the good is neither a public good nor a private commodity but
rather a "public commodity."' 13
The efficiency of a user fee on a public commodity will de-
pend on whether any externalities are involved. If there are no
externalities, it would appear that a user fee is most efficient
and appropriate because the government should recover the ac-
tual cost of providing the service. However, it would seem that
in such a case the government is acting as a market would."14
Therefore, if the fee would offend a separate constitutional pro-
hibition, then perhaps the market should assume the provision
of the service so as to avoid the constitutional conflict.
Where, however, there are externalities to account for, a
user fee may be very appropriate. 115 A user fee may encourage
the efficient utilization of resources (resources whose use will
presumably benefit society at large) that will go under used if
simply left to the market place.116 Likewise a user fee may
eliminate the cross subsidy to a private activity which gener-
ates costs to third parties."17 To the extent that a user fee ac-
complishes either of these goals, it seems to be effective when it
encourages or discourages behaviors by increasing or decreas-
ing the cost of engaging in a behavior (using a service). These
111. See id. at 801-03. The theory behind user fees reveals that the serv-
ices or goods in general may be either excludable or nonexcludable, namely,
either its use can be controlled or it cannot. See Schroepfer, supra note 100, at
414. Moreover, the services are either rival or nonrival, meaning the use by
one precludes the use of another or it does not. See id. User fees are appro-
priate for either excludable nonrival services or rival nonexcludable services.
See id. Rival excludable services are called private commodities and nonrival
nonexcludable services are called public goods. See id.
112. See Schroepfer, supra note 100, at 414.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 413.
115. See Wolfe, supra note 68, at 733-34.
116. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 803-05.
117. See id. at 814-15.
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types of "externality accounting" user fees present the most
troubling potential conflict with the Export Clause because
they serve a cost-efficient purpose which cannot be achieved
without government intervention.
Finally, it would appear that user fees imposed for reasons
other than market failures (i.e., to further legitimate, but dis-
cretionary government goals, such as revenue enhancement)
should cede in all instances to a constitutional prohibition. If a
user fee is imposed based upon fairness or redistribution rea-
sons, it would appear that the very imposition of the fee, or at
least its calculation, is discretionary from an economic effi-
ciency standpoint.118 Rules of efficiency, which are objective
and predictable, do not mandate the fee. Instead, the fee is im-
posed and calculated in part by subjective criteria. 119 Thus, it
should be subject to an outright constitutional prohibition. 120
Similarly, fees imposed for purposes of revenue enhance-
ment are most discretionary. 12 1 Given the tax nature of reve-
nue enhancement user fees, it would seem that such fees
should at least be subject to the same restrictions as pure tax-
ing measures. Lastly, where a fee is imposed to encourage ra-
tionalization and privatization, its purpose is to test the exis-
tence of a market failure. 122  Congress should choose an
alternative testing mechanism, rather than offend an absolute
constitutional prohibition. Moreover, if the same cost can be
imposed by a private entity without any efficiency loss, it would
seem simplest to avoid the constitutional conflict by removing
the government as instigator.
118. See id.
119. As Professors Gillette and Hopkins point out, fairness concerns may
trump efficiency arguments for or against user fees. See id. at 815. Neverthe-
less, because such concerns are in our view necessarily subjective, they should
not trump a constitutional prohibition.
120. The Export Clause is:
a restriction on the power of Congress; and as in accordance with the
rules heretofore noticed the grants of powers should be so construed
as to give full efficacy to those powers and enable Congress to use
such means as it deems necessary to carry them into effect, so in like
manner a restriction should be enforced in accordance with its letter
and spirit, and no legislation can be tolerated which, although it may
not conflict with the letter, destroys the spirit and purpose of the re-
striction imposed.
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 290 (1901).
121. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 819.
122. See id. at 821-22.
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Thus, as Gillette and Hopkins demonstrate, user fees are
most appropriate, and distinguishable from a tax, when the
user fees are imposed to provide for the efficient allocation of
resources which have failed to be provided by the market.123 As
stated above, to the extent that a user fee on exports involves a
public service with little or no marginal cost, it seems that a
user fee would be inappropriate in that such an exaction cannot
be based on an approximation of use124 Therefore, it must fall
into the category of a "tax" which does not necessarily correlate
to use and is, without argument, prohibited by the Export
Clause. Likewise, user fees imposed for reasons not having to
do with market failures are, at least in part, discretionary, and
should not trump a seemingly absolute constitutional prohibi-
tion.
The resulting question, therefore, is whether, where a user
fee accounts for an externality encouraging the most efficient
allocation of resources, that efficiency should be forfeited in or-
der to comply with the prohibition of the Export Clause. We
believe that the purposes behind the Commerce Clause and the
Export Clause may be preserved by explicating the meaning of
the Export Clause so as to identify offending exactions and con-
struct user fees in those instances to avoid offense. 25 In other
words, a clear and broad construction of the Export Clause will
identify its application to all exactions "laid on articles ex-
ported," but will also acknowledge its limitation to those exac-
tions. Therefore, exactions laid on the use of ports, for exam-
ple, would promote the underlying values of both the
Commerce Clause and the Export Clause, without running
afoul of either.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EXPORT
CLAUSE AND RELATED CLAUSES
The clear Export Clause standard we propose avoids the
limited conflict between the policy issues underlying the Export
Clause and the Commerce Clause. Past judicial interpretations
of the Export Clause, the Import-Export Clause, and the Com-
merce Clause have already extensively considered these policy
considerations. An integrated review of this combined body of
case law supports an interpretation of the Export Clause that
123. See id. at 802.
124. See id. at 802-03.
125. See infra Part V.
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protects exports from any national burden laid upon them
during the course of exportation, whether or not that burden
supports a legitimate exercise of a regulation by Congress. An
exaction is "laid on articles exported" if it (i) accrues during the
process of exportation; and (ii) bears a relationship to the prop-
erty to be exported.126 Thus, exactions made in connection with
exportation that bear no relationship to property to be ex-
ported, or that fail to accrue during the process of exportation
do not fall into the constitutional prohibition, whether charac-
terized as a tax or a fee. 2 7 Alternatively, as the text itself sug-
gests, an exaction pursuant to the Commerce Clause should
violate the Export Clause if it is laid on exported articles.
However, a Commerce Clause exaction that is not laid upon the
articles exported or that does not arise during the course of ex-
portation is permitted.
In contrast to interpretations of the Export Clause, judicial
interpretations of the Commerce Clause examine whether an
exaction is a permissible Commerce Clause exaction by ques-
tioning whether the exaction was incidental to a permissible
regulation. 128 The "incidental to" examination arose to identify
exercises of the Commerce Power as distinct from exercises of
the Taxing Power. Under the Taxing Power, Congress has the
authority to lay and collect taxes for the general support of the
government, i.e., to raise revenue. 129 However, exactions under
the Taxing Power are subject to certain specific limitations. 130
Commerce Power regulations may "incidentally" raise revenue,
126. See infra Part V.B. In our view an exaction bears a relationship to the
goods if it is calculated pursuant to the goods themselves or the process of ex-
portation.
127. See, e.g., Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1885); Pace v. Burgess,
92 U.S. 372, 375 (1875).
128. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,466-67 (1977).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
130. The Taxing Power Clause grants "a very extensive power... with only
one exception and two qualifications." Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S.
283, 295-96 (1901) (citing The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 462, 471
(1866)). Those qualifications, the Apportionment Clause and the Uniformity
Clause, apply to the exercise of the Taxing Power only. See id. at 296. The
Uniformity Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Im-
posts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The Apportionment Clause provides: "No Capitation,
or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enu-
meration herein before directed to be taken." Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The excep-
tion is the absolute ban provided in the Export Clause.
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and such exactions are not subject to the certain specific limita-
tions on the Taxing Power. 131 In some instances, determining
whether an exaction raises revenue under the Taxing Power, or
incidentally raises revenue via the Commerce Power may affect
whether the exaction is permissible. 132 Thus, the Commerce
Power inquiries contemplate the purpose of an act as well as its
result to determine whether Congress acted outside of its
power.
Finally, the analysis performed by courts under the Im-
port-Export Clause, after initially focusing on the nature of the
article taxed (whether it was an import or export) shifted to ex-
amining whether the exaction was an "Impost" or "Duty."133
The foundation for this inquiry can be traced to the specific
language chosen by the Framers, which appears to envision an
absolute ban on very precise types of exactions.' 34 To uncover
the type of exaction the Framers envisioned, the courts have
understandably gone beyond the text to adopt an interpretive
approach that examines the Framers' expectations. The lim-
ited specificity of the language used in the Import-Export
Clause warrants adoption of nontextual interpretive aids. 135
The Import-Export Clause language also reinforces the textual
approach for Export Clause interpretation. As discussed in
IBM, the Import-Export Clause required consideration of con-
textual factors because the language of the clause limited the
application of the clause to certain exactions. 136 In other words,
the language of the Import-Export Clause itself calls for a lim-
131. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 444 (addressing the intergovern-
mental tax immunity doctrine); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1973) (stating that taxes must be imposed by Con-
gress); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (holding that direct taxes are sub-
ject to the rule of proportionality and indirect taxes are subject to the rule of
uniformity); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 582-83 (1884) (discussing pro-
portionality); Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943) (dis-
cussing proportionality). Reference should also be made to the Origination
Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "[all Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
132. See infra notes 180-203 and accompanying text.
133. See United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 852 (1996).
134. See id. at 857.
135. See id. at 857-58 ("We said that the term 'Impost or Duty' is not
self-defining and does not necessarily encompass all taxes and that the re-
spondents' argument to the contrary ignored the central holding of Michelin
that the absolute ban is only of 'Imposts or Duties' and not of all taxes.")
(quoting Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring,
435 U.S. 734, 759 (1978)).
136. See id.
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ited ban, and thus, nontextual interpretive aids are needed to
define the scope of the ban. The Export Clause, by comparison,
revolves around comprehensive and absolute language, i.e., a
complete ban on all exactions. 137 Thus, the language of the
Clause itself supports a clear definition of its scope.
A. EARLY EXPORT CLAUSE CASES
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Ex-
port Clause to prohibit Congress from imposing any exaction
(whether a direct tax or otherwise) upon exports regardless of
whether or not it (i) raises revenue for the general revenue or
for a specific purpose, 138 (ii) is nondiscriminatory, or (iii) is
nominally characterized as something other than a tax. 39 The
series of Export Clause cases provide fairly clear language and
reasoning for the enunciation of these principles.
Since the earliest Export Clause cases commencing over
one hundred twenty years ago, the Court has focused on pro-
hibiting burdens "laid on articles exported." At the time of
those decisions, the Commerce Clause was not interpreted as
expansively as it would be in subsequent cases. 140 The early
Export Clause cases examined the requirements of the Export
Clause prohibition itself. These cases elicited a clear test for
137. The Court in IBM stated that it was:
hesitant to adopt the Import-Export Clause's policy-based analysis
without some indication that the Export Clause was intended to alle-
viate the same "evils" to which the Import-Export Clause was di-
rected. Unlike the Import-Export Clause, which was intended to pro-
tect federal supremacy in international commerce, to preserve federal
revenue from import duties and imposts, and to prevent coastal
States with ports from taking unfair advantage of inland States, the
Export Clause serves none of those goals. Indeed, textually, the Ex-
port Clause does quite the opposite. It specifically prohibits Congress
from regulating international commerce through export taxes, disal-
lows any attempt to raise federal revenue from exports, and has no
direct effect on the way the States treat imports and exports.
Id. at 859 (citations omitted).
138. The Court in Fairbank v. United States noted that the Framers spe-
cifically rejected an attempt to modify the prohibition to exclude taxes "for the
purpose of raising revenue." 181 U.S. 283, 292 (1901). This suggests that a
tax does not ever need to raise revenue to offend the Export Clause.
139. See id.; see also A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69-70
(1923); Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 27
(1915); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 15 (1915).
140. See generally infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (providing
broad background information about the Commerce Clause and how courts
have interpreted it).
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export taxes based upon the text of the clause,141 which can
easily continue to apply even in the post-Commerce Clause ex-
pansion era.
First, in Fairbank v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that a flat stamp tax on a bill of lading for exported goods
effected a tax on the goods themselves, and therefore, a tax on
exports. 142 In that case, the Court made clear that the Export
Clause was an absolute bar to any national burden being
placed upon exports, stating:
[wihether such a provision is or is not wise is a question of policy with
which the courts have nothing to do. We know historically that it was
one of the compromises which entered into and made possible the
adoption of the Constitution. It is a restriction on the power of Con-
gress .... 143
Thus, the Export Clause is a constitutional imperative that re-
quires neither an analysis of the goal of the Congress in im-
posing such a burden, nor of the discriminatory effect of the
burden nor of the nominal characterization of the burden.
The Fairbank Court stated that this broad construction of
the ban contained in the Export Clause was based on the
Framers' intent to prevent restrictive trade practices which
would burden exports.144 The Export Clause is unqualified
and, therefore, the goal of Congress in imposing a burden is ir-
relevant since congressional intent:
although obvious from the language of the clause itself, is reinforced
by the fact that in the constitutional convention Mr. Clymer moved to
insert after the word "duty" the words "for the purpose of revenue"
141. See, e.g., AG. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 69-70; Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S.
at 25; Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 15; Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292-93. The cases did,
however, establish a basic framework for defining what qualifies as in the pro-
cess of exportation and a tax or duty laid on articles exports. See infra Part
V.B.
142. 181 U.S. at 293.
143. Id. at 290. This statement by the Court indicates that, at least in the
Court's view, the Export Clause should be examined from a textual perspec-
tive. In fact, the Court stated that "[tihere are in that instrument grants of
power, prohibitions and a general reservation of ungranted powers.... [T]he
words expressing the various grants in the Constitution are words of general
import, and they are to be construed as such, and as granting to the full extent
the powers named." Id. at 287. The Court went on to state that:
if the Constitution in its grant of powers is to be so construed that
Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the power granted, it is
equally imperative that where prohibition or limitation is placed upon
the power of Congress that prohibition or limitation should be en-
forced in its spirit and to its entirety.
Id. at 289.
144. See id. at 292.
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but the motion was voted down. So it is clear that the framers of the
Constitution intended not merely that exports should not be made a
source of revenue to the National Government, but that the National
Government should put nothing in the way of burden upon such ex-
ports.
4
s
Thus, Fairbank understood the Export Clause as prohibiting
all exactions placed on exports.
Second, the Court foreshadowed future Commerce Clause
arguments when noting that the prohibition of the Export
Clause with respect to the tax could not be overcome by making
it even-handed or nondiscriminatory.
If mere discrimination between the States was all that was contem-
plated it would seem to follow that an ad valorem tax upon all exports
would not be obnoxious to this constitutional prohibition. But surely
under this limitation Congress can impose an export tax neither on
one article of export, nor on all articles of export.1
46
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Fairbank focused
on the ultimate question-what does the Export Clause pro-
hibit? The Court concluded that a tax on the goods, could not
be enacted. The Court correctly examined the power to tax and
Congress's ability to carry out any legitimate grant of power
with such means as it sees necessary.147 Nevertheless, the
Court pointed out that the absence of power renders methodol-
ogy irrelevant.
The fact that Congress has not graduated the stamp tax on bills of
lading does not affect the question of power. By a graduated system,
although the tax is called a tax on "the vellum, parchment or paper"
upon which transactions are written, or by which they are evidenced,
a burden may be cast upon exports sufficient to check or retard them
145. Id. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 292. The viability of challenges under the Export Clause should
not be underestimated based upon the less vigorous judicial application of the
prohibition contained in the Import-Export Clause. In fact, the courts have
restricted the scope of protection afforded by the Import-Export Clause to pro-
hibit only discriminatory taxes levied by states upon exports when the goods
are not in transit. This analysis, however, which focuses on a determination as
to the nature of the tax, was expressly rejected by the courts for challenges
under the Export Clause. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the Supreme Court's
IBM decision). Further, the limited protection afforded by the Import-Export
Clause may not be all that limited when the exaction is made upon goods
which are still in the course of importation or exportation. As discussed below,
the narrowing of the limitation occurred when a property tax was levied on all
goods and the question arose whether goods which had once been imports (and
were still in the custody of the importer) could be exempted from the tax. See
infra Part II.C.
147. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 289-92.
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and which will directly conflict with the constitutional provision that
no tax or duty shall be laid thereon.'48
Thus, Fairbank found that any exaction "laid on articles ex-
ported" violates the Export Clause regardless of how it is nomi-
nally characterized or described.
The Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe, by recognizing a user fee
exception to the Export Clause, indicated that the purpose of
the exaction (e.g., the proceeds being designated for a certain
fund) could affect the nature of the exaction (i.e., whether an
exaction was an export tax). This type of characterization was
first addressed in Fairbank where the Court, in response to an
argument which said that a tax on a bill of lading was not a tax
on the goods, rejected such labels.
[No legislation can be tolerated which, although it may not conflict
with the letter, destroys the spirit and purpose of the restriction im-
posed.... It can, for the purposes of revenue, receive just as much as
though it placed a duty directly upon the articles, and it can just as
fully restrict the free exportation which was one of the purposes of the
Constitution. 149
Likewise, an artificial camouflage constructed by virtue of des-
ignating the funds for a particular purpose would still restrict
the free exportation of the goods.
In United States v. Hvoslef,150 the Supreme Court rein-
forced the prohibition against exactions that fell upon exports
(or exportation) when it examined whether a stamp tax on
charter parties violated the Export Clause. The Court held
that the Export Clause was:
designed to give immunity from taxation to property that is in the ac-
tual course of such exportation.... It was the clear intent of the
Framers of the Constitution that "the process of exporting the prod-
ucts of a State, the goods, chattels, and property of the people of the
several States, should not be obstructed or hindered by any burden of
taxation."'
Once again the Court looked solely to whether the tax fell upon
exports and did not examine its relationship to an exporter's
use of a government service. Hvoslef makes clear that the tax
could cover:
a small lot, or a partial cargo, or an entire cargo, whether the goods
occupy a part of the cargo space or the whole cargo space, can make
no constitutional difference. The charters were for the exportation;
they related to it exclusively; they serve no other purpose. A tax on
148. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 290-91.
150. 237 U.S. 1 (1915).
151. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
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these charter parties was in substance a tax on the exportation, and a
tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.'5 2
Thus, Hvoslef rejected an attempt to justify a tax as an appro-
priate approximation of use.
Likewise, in Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v.
United States,'53 the plaintiff brought an action to recover the
amount paid as stamp taxes upon policies insuring certain ex-
ports against marine risks. The Supreme Court inquired
whether the tax was "so directly and closely related to the 'pro-
cess of exporting' that the tax is in substance a tax upon the
exportation and hence within the constitutional prohibi-
tion[.]"1 54 The Court held that the insurance upon goods was
such a necessity of exportation that a tax upon such policies
was, in effect, a tax upon the goods themselves and, as such, a
violation of the Export Clause.155
Following Thames & Mersey, the Supreme Court in A.G.
Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards,156 held that an ad valorem sales
tax imposed upon bats and balls violated the Export Clause be-
cause the sale triggering the tax occurred when the goods were
delivered to the carrier for export, and thus the process of ex-
portation and the protection of the Export Clause had begun. 157
The tax could not be saved by its accord with a general law that
applied to all sales of the merchandise. The Court reaffirmed
Thames & Mersey and noted that "one would doubt that...
[the goods] were exempt after they had been loaded upon the
vessel." 58
152. Id. at 17.
153. 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
154. Id. at 25.
155. The Court noted that a tax on the marine policies was a tax upon ex-
portation and distinguished it from a tax upon the goods themselves not im-
posed during the process of exportation. See id. at 27. "It is manifest that we
are not called upon to deal with transactions which merely anticipate exporta-
tion, or with goods that are not in the course of being actually exported." Id.
at 25 (citations omitted). However, the Court did not elaborate on how the tax
was otherwise tied to the goods. The failure to establish a method by which an
exaction not nominally placed upon articles exported could be tied to the goods
was again repeated in IBM. In IBM, the Court simply adopted the holding in
Thames & Mersey. This failure was criticized by the dissent in IBM. See su-
pra Part I.A.; infra Part V.B.
156. 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
157. Again, when the exaction fell "on articles exported," as in this case, by
virtue of being triggered by the process of exportation, the nature of the tax
(its method of calculation or purpose or even-handedness) was irrelevant. See
id. at 69.
158. Id.
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Finally, in Pace v. Burgess,159 the Court considered
whether the Export Clause was violated by a law requiring ex-
porters to purchase a stamp from the government and affix it to
packages of tobacco which were to be exported. 160 Because
there was a general tobacco tax to which exported tobacco was
not subject, the Commission of Internal Revenue needed a
means by which to identify the exempt tobacco. Exporters were
charged 25 cents per stamp used to segregate packages. The
Court held that the stamp was clearly not a "tax on the ex-
port"161 because the charge for the stamp bore no relationship
whatsoever to the quantity or value of the package to which it
was affixed. 162 Thus, the Court formulated part of an Export
Clause definition by finding that at the very least an Export
Clause tax had to bear a relationship to the exported articles.
In finding that the tax in question was not an Export
Clause tax or duty, the Court in Pace likened the charge for the
stamps to a "fee for clearing the vessel.., or for making out
and certifying the manifest of the cargo."163 In short, the Court
saw the charge for the stamps as representing a charge for the
"employment of [an] instrumentality" provided by the govern-
ment.16
Pace did not, however, carve out a user fee exception in
making the foregoing analogy. If the tax in question bore a re-
lationship to the articles exported (and was imposed during the
process of exportation) 16 5 it would have fallen within the consti-
159. 92 U.S. 372 (1875).
160. See id. at 374.
161. Id. at 375.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 376.
165. In Turpin v. Burgess, a manufacturer sued to recover the money it had
paid for export exemption stamps. 117 U.S. 504, 504 (1886). Without dis-
turbing the prior ruling in Pace, the Court held that the stamp charge was not
a tax on exports. See id. at 507. The Court explained that the prohibition of
the Export Clause "has reference to the imposition of duties on goods by rea-
son or because of their exportation or intended exportation, or whilst they are
being exported." Id. The Court continued, "[iun the present case, the tax (if it
was a tax) was laid upon the goods before they had left the factory. They were
not in course of exportation; they might never be exported; whether they
would be or not would depend altogether on the will of the manufacturer." Id.
(emphasis added).
In Cornell v. Coyne, the Court addressed whether the Export Clause pro-
hibited the application of a federal excise tax on filled cheese manufactured
under contract for export. 192 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1904). Relying on Turpin,
the Court rejected the contention that the Export Clause bars application of a
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tutional prohibition, even if it also compensated the govern-
ment for services rendered to the exporter. Pace merely found
that the exaction in question bore no quantitative or valuative
relationship to the goods because the exaction was calculated
without reference to the goods. 166
Some may argue that the Court in Pace sustained the tax
on the grounds that the exaction was made in order to fund a
legitimate exercise of the Commerce Power. Given the opinion
in Pace, we do not suggest that such a reading is clearly erro-
neous or absurd. However, we suggest that the Court in Pace
found that the tax fell outside of the Export Clause's prohibi-
tion not because it was not a"revenue raising exaction" under
the Taxing Power or fell into some mythical user fee exception
under the Export Clause, but because the exaction was not laid
upon articles exported and bore no relationship to those arti-
cles. 16 7 The fact that it also funded a legitimate service pro-
vided by the government does not affect its nature. Thus, Pace
should not be read as a case in which the Court recognized a
user fee exception to the Export Clause. Rather the tax in Pace
simply did not implicate the prohibition of the Export Clause.
Fairbank, Hvoslef, Thames & Mersey and A.G. Spalding all
followed Pace and support the foregoing analysis of Pace. The
Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe toyed with an analysis that recog-
nized that an exaction such as the one in Pace is simply not a
tax on exports. 16 8 However, in failing to state what a tax on ex-
ports is, the U.S. Shoe Court implied the user fee exception:
In sum, if we are to "guard against... the imposition of a [tax] under
the pretext of fixing a fee" and resist erosion of the Court's decision in
IBM, we must hold that the HMT violates the Export Clause as ap-
plied to exports. This does not mean that exporters are exempt from
any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor develop-
nondiscriminatory tax imposed before the product entered the course of expor-
tation. See id. at 427-28. "The true construction of the constitutional provi-
sion is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation
of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the
prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situ-
ated." Id. at 427. Cornell made clear that nondiscriminatory pre-exportation
assessments do not violate the Export Clause, even if the goods are eventually
exported.
166. 92 U.S. at 375.
167. See infra Part V.B.
168. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369-70
(1998).
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ment and maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must
fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities. 69
Thus, the U.S. Shoe Court implied that the Export Clause per-
mits a user fee on exports so long as the fee approximates use.
This implication is simply not supported by the language of the
Export Clause, by Pace, or by the other Export Clause prece-
dent.
Furthermore, the Court's own language in U.S. Shoe belies
the implication that it makes. The Court stated that "[tihis
does not mean that exporters are exempt from any and all user
fees designed to defray the cost of harbor development and
maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must
fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities."170
The Court is correct in stating that "exporters" may not be ex-
empt from user fees, 17 1 but it fails to specify that "exports" are
indeed exempt from user fees that offend the Export Clause. It
is exactly this distinction that is glossed over by the Court's
ruling and analysis. As discussed throughout this Article, if
properly formulated, a user fee may indeed be charged on har-
bor use without running afoul of the Export Clause. However,
until the Export Clause standard is properly formulated and
clarified, confusion and litigation will abound. Thus, efforts
should be made to properly formulate user fees which would
not run afoul of the Export Clause, rather than attempting to
make exceptions for user fees under the Export Clause.
The implication that there is a user fee exception to the
Export Clause is unsupported by the Court's analysis and is di-
rectly contradicted by Export Clause precedent, and the Export
Clause itself.172 From these early Export Clause cases, and
from the text itself, one can formulate a definition of an export
tax which would first inquire whether the exaction was on ex-
ports or the process of exportation within the meaning of the
Export Clause.
169. Id. at 370 (citations omitted).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. However, a fee directed solely at exporters would violate the Export
Clause as it would in effect be a tax on the process of exportation. See discus-
sion infra Part V.B. "A bill of lading, therefore, or some equivalent instrument
of writing, is invariably associated with every cargo of merchandise exported
to a foreign country, and consequently a duty upon that is, in substance and
effect, a duty on the article exported." Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S.
283, 294 (1901).
172. See discussion infra Part VA.
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Fairbank, Hvoslef, Thames & Mersey, and A.G. Spalding
found that any burden on exports violated the Export Clause,
regardless of how it was nominally characterized or described.
These cases evaluated exactions which were triggered by the
process of exportation, and assessed on an attribute of the
goods to be exported, or on a process intimately connected to
exportation. The cases found that these burdens violated the
Export Clause. Rather than presenting some limitation to this
broad prohibition of burdens on exports, Pace merely evaluated
an exaction which was not calculated pursuant to an attribute
of the goods, and thus not "laid on articles exported." The rul-
ing in Pace did not find a type of exaction outside the scope of
"tax"; instead it found an exaction outside the scope of "tax or
duty laid on articles exported" and therefore outside the scope
of the Export Clause.
B. COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
The Commerce Clause grants the federal government the
"power to prescribe the rules by which commerce is to be gov-
erned."173 Although the Commerce Clause broadened during
the expansion era,174 it is not unlimited. The courts, consider-
ing the issue of regulatory statutes imposing exactions, found
the generation of revenue to be outside the power granted un-
der the Commerce Clause. 175 That is, with an important excep-
tion: if the generation of revenue was purely incidental to the
regulation of commerce, then it would remain within the
173. Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943).
174. See Bruce Little, A Case of Judicial Backsliding: Artificial Restraints
on the Commerce Power Reach of the Sherman Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 163,
173-75; David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's
Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 379 (1996); Ste-
phen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional
Power Under the Commerce Clause? 44 U. KAN L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1996).
The "expansion" refers to the Supreme Court's shift from its restrictive inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause in cases such as United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895) (recognizing a distinction between manufac-
turing, which Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause, and
commerce which Congress may regulate when it has a direct effect on inter-
state commerce), to a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, in cases
such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (finding
that Congress may regulate labor relations because companies engaging in
unfair labor practices have a close and substantial relationship to interstate
commerce).
175. See Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382, 391 (9th Cir. 1967); Rodgers, 138
F.2d at 994.
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breadth of the Commerce Clause. 7 6 The courts began identi-
fying two types of exactions which could raise revenue within
the confines of the Commerce Clause: (i) a user fee paid to de-
fray the cost of regulation or (ii) a penalty imposed to enforce a
regulation of commerce. 177 Thus, the cases examined have de-
fined the breadth of the Commerce Clause by delineating ex-
actly the limited exception to the precept that regulations can-
not raise revenue. In addition, the Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledged that such Commerce Clause exactions could not
otherwise offend the Constitution' 78-indicating that testing for
other unconstitutionality must precede the user fee analysis.
Courts have been called upon to delineate the permissible
exactions under the Commerce Clause when such exactions, if
made under the Taxing Power, would be impermissible. An ex-
action under the Commerce Clause is not subject to the limita-
tions on the Taxing Power, namely the Uniformity and Appor-
tionment Clauses. 179 Commerce Clause cases which inquire
into the authority of Congress do so in order to evaluate an ex-
ercise of power and not to determine whether a prohibition has
been violated.
For example, in The Head Money Cases the plaintiff chal-
lenged a "duty" of fifty cents upon each non-United States pas-
senger who came by vessel from a foreign port to any port
within the United States.18 0 The plaintiff challenged the exac-
tion as an exercise of the Taxing Power and thus subject to and
in violation of the Uniformity Clause.' 8' The government con-
tended that the charge was a fee for services rather than a tax,
and thus not subject to the Uniformity Clause which limited
the Taxing Power only and not the Commerce Clause. The
money was to be used to "defray the expense of regulating im-
migration under [the] act," caring for immigrants arriving in
the United States, for the relief of immigrants in distress, and
for the general purposes and expenses of carrying the Act into
effect. 18 2 The fee was calculated on a per use basis and in dis-
176. See Moon, 379 F.2d at 391; Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994.
177. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1884).
178. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 464 (1978). This is
the first prong of the three-prong test developed in Massachusetts. See infra
text accompanying notes 198-202.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
180. 112 U.S. at 581.
181. See id. 112 U.S. at 583.
182. Id. at 590. The Act in question also provided for limits on the number
of passengers which any vessel could carry. See id. at 589. It called for a gov-
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bursing the money raised by the fee, no port could receive more
money than it provided. Based upon the foregoing, the Court
found that the exaction was a "mere incident of the regulation
of commerce."183
In so finding the Court first looked to the overall purpose of
the Act, which it found was the regulation of immigration, and
not the raising of funds for the general welfare. The Court's
inquiry into the purpose of the Act appears to be a logical exer-
cise given that the Court's decision turned upon whether the
Act was enacted pursuant to the Commerce or Taxing Power.
To evaluate an exercise of power one must necessarily ask
"what was Congress trying to do?" 184 By ascertaining what the
Congress had intended to do, that is, regulate commerce, the
Court could apply existing limitations on that .power and de-
termine whether Congress exercised its power within those
limitations. 8 5
Likewise, in Rodgers v. United States,8 6 the plaintiff chal-
lenged, on the basis of the proportionality requirement, 8 7 a
penalty imposed by Congress on the marketing of excess cotton.
The statute in question imposed cotton quotas upon farmers,
and exacted a penalty on over-production in order to enforce
those quotas. The court held that Congress did not levy a tax
pursuant to the Taxing Power, but rather established a regula-
tion to achieve the express purpose of controlling production of
cotton affecting interstate commerce.188 The court reasoned
that to determine what power Congress used in enacting the
statute it was necessary to "view the objects and purposes of
the statute as a whole." 8 9 The court determined that Con-
gress's clear intent in enacting such a scheme was to regulate
and conserve commerce, not to raise revenue. Thus, the court
ernment official to i) board and inspect vessels (ii) identify those who should
not be permitted to land, and (iii) return them to the country from which they
came. See id. at 590.
183. Id. at 596.
184. Id. at 591.
185. Compare such an inquiry to one which determines whether an act is
prohibited. In such a case the questions are no longer "what did the doer in-
tend to do?" Rather, because a court is faced with an absolute prohibition
rather than a choice of limitations, the question is only "What did the doer ac-
tually do?" Thus, evaluating an exercise of the grant of power differs from
evaluating an absolute prohibition on constitutional powers.
186. 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943).
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
188. See Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994.
189. Id.
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characterized the exaction as a penalty designed to regulate the
behavior of the farmers, not as a tax to generally raise revenue.
The court's holding rendered the proportionality requirement
irrelevant because it only applies to acts enacted pursuant to
the Taxing Power.
In National Cable Television Association v. United
States,190 petitioner challenged the Federal Communications
Commissioner's imposition of a fee as an unauthorized exercise
of the Taxing Power. The Court inquired into the purpose of
the exaction and that of the Independent Offices Appropriation
Act' 9 ' which authorized federal agencies to prescribe fees for
services which benefited a select portion of the public. In doing
so, the Court emphasized the behavioral standard for identify-
ing a user fee:
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole or-
gan for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard benefits be-
stowed by the Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to
pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a vol-
untary act, e.g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant to
practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast sta-
tion. The public agency performing those services normally may ex-
act a fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the ap-
plicant, not shared by other members of society.
9 2
Thus, the Court emphasized the necessary connection of a user
fee to the behavior sought to be regulated.
In addition, National Cable indicated that only by enacting
taxes under its Taxing Power may Congress impose charges
which bear no correlation to the reciprocal benefits bestowed
upon a taxpayer for his or her behavior.193 Only under the
Taxing Power may Congress arbitrarily assess charges (e.g.,
based upon ability to pay, value of the property, or income)
without any calculation of the benefits bestowed on the tax-
payer. 194 Taxes are levied for the support of the government,
with their amount and structure dictated only by the govern-
ment's view of what is necessary. 195 On the other hand, a user
fee may not be based arbitrarily on the obligor's ability to pay,
the value of property, or income, but rather must correlate di-
190. 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974).
191. See id. at 337 (citing the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 31
U.S.C. § 483(a) (1952) (amended by and codified as 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982)).
192. Id. at 340-41 (footnote omitted).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 340.
195. See id. at 341.
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rectly to the behavior sought to be regulated and/or the service
provided.196 Tolls or fees are compensation for the use of a
service or property, and must be structured and determined by
the value or benefit conferred upon the payor for the use of the
service or property.1 97 The Court's distinction between user
fees and taxes was warranted given the nature of the challenge
in National Cable. However, the Export Clause makes no such
distinction between taxes that approximate use and those that
are arbitrary.
In the most telling case with respect to the issue under dis-
cussion, Massachusetts v. United States, 198 the Supreme Court
enunciated a three-prong test derived from earlier case law to
identify a user fee incidental to the regulation of commerce. 199
In addressing whether an aircraft registration fee violated the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine,2°° the Court stated
that to constitute a user fee, (1) the charge must not discrimi-
nate against a constitutionally-protected interest; (2) the im-
plementing authority must base the charge upon a fair ap-
proximation of the use of some regulatory system; and (3) the
charge must be structured to produce revenue fairly appor-
tioned to the total cost to the Government of the benefits con-
ferred.20' The last two prongs merely re-emphasize the prior
case law holdings requiring correlation of the exaction to the
behavior sought to be regulated. However, the first prong of
the analysis implies an additional prerequisite: that, by defini-
tion, an exaction which offends a constitutionally-protected in-
terest is not a user fee. In Massachusetts, the Court stated
that:
196. See id.
197. See id.; see also Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S.
288, 294 (1887) (explaining that tolls are intended to compensate the property
owner).
198. 435 U.S. 444 (1977).
199. See id. at 464 (citing Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716-720 (1972)).
200. The intergovernmental immunity doctrine was first recognized in Col-
lector v. Day, which implied the immunity from the existence of the states as
independent sovereigns at the time the Constitution was adopted. 78 U.S. (11
Wall) 113 (1870). In Day, the Court reasoned that the immunity sprung from
the Constitution's guarantee that the states continue to function as states per-
forming traditional sovereign functions. See id. at 125-26. As an implied im-
munity, the protection of states from federal taxation has undergone signifi-
cant narrowing. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 455-56.
201. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 464-70.
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So long as the charges do not discriminate against state functions, are
based on a fair approximation of use of the system, and are structured
to produce revenues that will not exceed the total cost to the Federal
Government of the benefits to be supplied, there can be no substantial
basis for a claim that the National Government will be using its tax-
ing powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's abil-
ity to perform essential services. 2°
Therefore, Massachusetts suggests that not only is there no
user fee exception to the Export Clause, but that before being
able to apply a Commerce Clause user fee analysis, the courts
must first determine if a constitutionally-protected interest-
such as the Export Clause-is offended. This test requires, logi-
cally, that the Export Clause constitutionality of an exaction be
examined first, prior to any determination of whether such ex-
action is a user fee.
One Ninth Circuit case used a grant of power analysis to
determine whether the Export Clause's constitutional prohibi-
tion had been violated.20 3 In Moon v. Freeman, the court ex-
amined whether the structure of the Agricultural Act of 1964
violated the Export Clause.2°4 Under the Act, wheat farmers
who voluntarily participated in an acreage control program be-
came eligible for domestic and export wheat marketing certifi-
cates. The number of certificates available for any particular
year depended upon the Secretary of Agriculture's projected re-
quirement of wheat for domestic use, export use, and the pro-
jected supply. Using these projections, the Secretary would de-
termine how much of the projected supply would require price
support in order to maintain the price goals set by the Act.
Further, the Secretary would set the face value of the certifi-
cates, although he could not do so arbitrarily.
20 5
In the year in question, the Secretary had determined that
90% of the supply of wheat would require price support. Thus,
each farmer participating in acreage control as set forth in the
202. Id. at 466-67 (emphasis added).
203. See Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1967). The court
indicated that if an exaction is enacted pursuant to some purported regulatory
scheme which raises a substantial amount of revenue, it in fact cannot be
characterized as purely incidental to a regulation of commerce. See id. at 384-
90. The court stated that "certainly if the record in any way indicated that
substantial amounts of revenue had been generated by the sale of export cer-
tificates, we would hesitate before deeming the program an exercise of the
commerce power." Id. at 392.
204. See id. at 384 (citing the Agricultural Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-297,
78 Stat. 178 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.)).
205. See id. at 385.
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Act would be given (rather than having to purchase) certificates
for 90% of his projected yield. Nonparticipating farmers would
have to buy the certificates either from farmers who were given
certificates, but did not produce their projected yield, or from
the Secretary. To the extent that nonparticipating farmers
produced even more wheat than had been projected, the de-
mand for certificates would increase and the cost (either paid to
the Secretary or to a participating farmer) would increase. The
Secretary could not print more certificates in order to raise
more funds and once the certificates were used, they were void.
Finally, in order to encourage exports, the face value of the cer-
tificate would be adjusted on the date of exportation depending
upon the international price of wheat. Thus, exporters some-
times could receive a subsidy from the use of an export certifi-
cate. 20
6
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals in Moon held
that because the Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause,
it was not subject to the prohibition of the Export Clause.207
The court specifically rejected the argument that the Export
Clause acted as a limitation upon the Commerce Clause as well
as the Taxing Power. Inexplicably, the court quoted Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden and its reference to the Com-
merce Power: "'[it is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the Constitution.'"'208 It is difficult
to suppose to what limitations the Moon court thought Mar-
shall was referring, since it would appear that the Export
Clause is one of those constitutional limitations.
The court qualified its own analysis by adding that a fee
"nominally imposed under the commerce power" also could be
considered an exercise of the power to raise revenue and there-
fore was barred by the Export Clause. 209 Had the court im-
206. See id. at 385-86.
207. See id. at 385.
208. Id. at 389 (emphasis added) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
209. See id. at 390. The Supreme Court previously held that the exercise of
the Taxing Power is not mutually exclusive of the exercise of another grant of
power. The power of taxation may be utilized by Congress to effectuate the
exercise of another power which is granted to Congress. See Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393-94 (1940).
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posed an Export Clause analysis in the first place, this qualifi-
cation would have been unnecessary.210
Under an Export Clause analysis, dictated by the text and
supported by the Supreme Court case law, the Moon court
should have determined that the exaction did not offend the
Export Clause because it was not "laid upon articles exported."
The monies exacted for the export certificates were not "laid on
the articles exported" as the amount charged for the certificates
was not calculated based upon an attribute of the goods. Like
the exaction in Pace, the monies in Moon were not calculated
based upon a formula which had as a variable some attribute of
the goods. One could argue that for any particular export, the
scheme in Moon imposed a "price" upon the export certificate
that related to the quantity to be exported. However, given the
formula established by the Act in Moon, it would appear that
the monies exacted were calculated not with reference to any
particular exportation of wheat but with reference to a wheat
market. Thus, it is our view that Moon was correctly decided,
but wrongly reasoned.
In summary, the foregoing cases held that an exaction was
a user fee or penalty charged for the purpose of regulating
commerce, and thus not subject to the limitations of the Taxing
Power. The courts evaluated the exercise of power by examin-
ing the approximation of use, the amount of revenue generated
and the compliance with other constitutional provisions. These
cases fail to carve out a user fee exception to constitutional
prohibitions such as the Export Clause. In fact, they reinforce
the idea that exactions made pursuant to the Commerce Clause
are entitled to no special exceptions from explicit constitutional
restrictions such as the Export Clause.
C. IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE CASES
The Import-Export Clause prohibition requires courts to
look beyond its textual provisions for the scope of the protection
afforded by the clause. Traditionally, the Import-Export
Clause was thought to have created a "general prohibition
against state taxation of imports and exports," i.e., goods which
210. See, e.g., United States v. West Texas Cotton Oil Co., 155 F.2d 463,
465 (5th Cir. 1946) (considering a challenge to penalties paid under the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the Fifth Circuit implicitly made a Com-
merce Clause distinction in validating the exaction by looking at the purpose
of the Act rather than the result).
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traveled in foreign commerce. 211 Consequently, courts focused
on whether articles were imports or exports to determine
whether they were immune from state taxation (regardless of
the type of taxation, i.e., excise tax or property tax). A shift in
Import-Export Clause analysis began in Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages,212 where the Court focused its inquiry on the nature of
the exaction, rather than the status of the goods.213 Michelin
pointed to the limiting language of the Import-Export Clause,
prohibiting only "Imposts or Duties," to justify a more specific
inquiry into the nature of the exaction. Thus, to evaluate the
nature of the exaction, the Court inquired into the intent of the
Framers in choosing the limited language of the Import-Export
Clause.214
Traditionally, the Import-Export Clause protected imports
and exports from "state exactions upon imports as imports" or
exports as exports.215 A broader interpretation of the Import-
Export Clause prohibition arose after a misreading of dictum
from Brown v. Maryland by the Court in Low v. Austin.216 Low
had struck down a nondiscriminatory property tax, because
imports were stored in property subject to the tax.217 Prior to
Low, property taxes that did not single out imports or exports
were not thought to violate the Import-Export Clause.218
Brown held that a discriminatory license fee would violate the
Import-Export Clause. In doing so, it retreated from announc-
ing a universal rule. Instead it simply carved out a class of
items which could not be taxed without offending the Import-
Export Clause. Before an item loses its distinctive character as
an import, "while remaining the property of the importer, in his
warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was im-
ported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape
the prohibition in the constitution."219 From this equivocal dic-
tum, Low reasoned that any tax-even if it fell on property,
rather than on the goods-would be invalidated if imports or
211. IBM Corp. v. United States, 59 F.3d 1234, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
212. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
213. See id. at 282.
214. See id. at 282-83.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 282.
217. See Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29, 33 (1871).
218. See id.
219. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827).
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exports were involved, or if the exaction fell on imports as im-
ports or exports as exports.220
The Michelin Court characterized Low as "the leading de-
cision of this Court holding that the States are prohibited by
the Import-Export Clause from imposing a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax on imported goods until they lose their
character as imports and become incorporated into the mass of
property in the State."221 Michelin involved Georgia's effort to
impose ad valorem property taxes on Michelin's inventory of
imported tires and tubes. Michelin, relying on Low, argued
that the ad valorem tax was prohibited by the Import-Export
Clause, as it was imposed on goods which traveled in foreign
commerce. The Court rejected Michelin's position, stating:
"[niothing in the history of the Import-Export Clause even re-
motely suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
tax which is also imposed on imported goods that are no longer
in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded as
objectionable by the Framers of the Constitution."222 Low, the
Court continued, improperly expanded the protection of the
Import-Export Clause and rejected the better reasoned views
expressed by earlier Justices, 223 that an examination of the ori-
gins of the Clause "makes crystal clear that the prohibition ap-
plied only to state exactions upon imports as imports and did
not apply to nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes. '224
Accordingly, the Court found that Low was wrongly decided
and explicitly overruled it.225
Michelin recharacterized the focus of the Import-Export
Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports, to the na-
ture of the tax at issue (i.e., whether the tax is an "impost or
duty" and thus barred by the Import-Export Clause).226 Spe-
cifically, the Court found the tax was not an impost or duty be-
220. See Low, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 34.
221. Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 282.
222. Id. at 286.
223. For example, Justice Marshall's views in Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
at 458, and Justice Taney's views in The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall)
462, 481 (1866).
224. Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
225. See id. at 301.
226. See id. at 301 n.13; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham
County, 479 U.S. 130, 156 (1986) (concluding that an ad valorem tax on im-
ports does not violate the Import-Export Clause); Limbach v. Hooven & Allison
Co., 466 U.S. 353, 363 (1984) (holding that Michelin changed the Import-
Export Clause inquiry to whether the tax is an impost or duty).
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cause it did not offend the policies behind the clause: (i) concern
that an impost or duty might interfere with the federal gov-
ernment's regulation of commercial relations with foreign gov-
ernments; (ii) fear that on account of such state taxation the
federal government would lose an important source of revenue;
and (iii) a desire to maintain harmony among the states, which
would be disturbed if seaboard states could tax goods "merely
flowing through their ports" to other states not so favorably
situated.227
The Michelin analysis of a challenge to imposts or duties
on imports under the Import-Export Clause was then extended
to a tax on exports under the Import-Export Clause, in Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Cos. 228 The Court resumed the analysis it had begun in Mich-
elin. The Court noted that "Michelin initiated a different ap-
proach to Import-Export Clause cases. It ignored the simple
question whether the tires and tubes were imports. Instead, it
analyzed the nature of the tax to determine whether it was an
'Impost or Duty' .... ,229
Although the Court in Washington Stevedoring recognized
that there were some factual distinctions between it and Mich-
elin,230 it extended the Michelin "three concerns" analysis to
taxation involving exports. The Court pointed out that an ex-
port tax need only be measured against the first and third con-
cerns: the export-tax ban of the Import-Export Clause does not
serve the second concern, protection of federal revenues. 231
Importantly, Michelin differed from Washington Stevedor-
ing in that the tax in Michelin fell on the goods themselves,
whereas the tax in Washington Stevedoring fell on stevedoring,
the business of loading and unloading ships. 232 The Court
noted that a tax on the stevedoring did not relate to the value
227. Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 285-86.
228. 435 U.S. 734, 764(1978).
229. Id. at 752.
230. One of the distinctions between Washington Stevedoring and Michelin
was that in Michelin the tax was not upon goods in transit. Thus, the ques-
tion faced by the Court in Washington Stevedoring-whether the Import-
Export Clause prohibited a nondiscriminatory tax upon goods in the process of
exportation, regardless of whether the concerns of the Framers were even im-
plicated-was left unanswered by Michelin and ultimately by Washington Ste-
vedoring as well.
231. The Export Clause eliminates the federal government's concern, as no
federal source of revenue exists with respect to exports.
232. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757.
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of the goods being transported and, therefore, could not be con-
sidered a tax on the goods themselves.233
In order to draw the distinction between a tax on goods and
a tax on services, Washington Stevedoring referred briefly to
Canton Railroad Co. v. Rogan.234 In Canton Railroad, the
Court upheld a gross-receipts tax on a railroad which engaged
in various services relating to importing and exporting. Canton
Railroad upheld the tax because it found the immunity pro-
vided by the Import-Export Clause to services incidental to ex-
porting was not as broad as the immunity provided to the goods
themselves.235 This distinction described in Canton Railroad
also found favor in Washington Stevedoring.236
Unfortunately, no bright-line test for distinguishing be-
tween goods and related services emerged from Canton Rail-
road. However, as the Court in Washington Stevedoring noted,
Canton Railroad did distinguish the tax it upheld from other
taxes which the Court had previously invalidated.237 Among
the cases distinguished was Thames & Mersey. In the words of
the Washington Stevedoring Court:
In [the cases in which the Court had previously struck down
taxes,] ... the State had taxed either the goods or activity so con-
nected with the goods that the levy amounted to a tax on the goods
themselves.... [T]he stamp tax on bills of lading in Fairbank effec-
tively taxed the goods because the bills represented the goods. The
basis for distinguishing Thames & Mersey is less clear because there
the tax fell upon marine insurance policies. Arguably, the policies
had a value apart from the value of the goods. In distinguishing that
case from the taxation of stevedoring activities, however, one might
note that the value of goods bears a much closer relation to the value
of insurance policies on them than to the value of loading and un-
loading ships."'
Thus, not only was the nature of the prohibited exaction in the
Import-Export Clause narrower than that of the Export Clause,
but the reach of the immunity also appeared more limited.239
233. See id.
234. Canton R.R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 519 (1951).
235. See id. at 519.
236. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757.
237. Id. at 756 n.21.
238. Id.
239. It is unclear whether Washington Stevedoring calls Thames & Mersey
into question. We would argue that Thames & Mersey's holding, that a tax on
insurance policies was related to the goods so as to be a tax upon the goods
themselves, should have been re-examined in IBM. The dissent in IBM
thought so too. See United States v. IBM Corp. 517 U.S. 843, 863-64 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The distinction between the immunities found in the Ex-
port Clause and the Import-Export Clause can be traced at
least in part to their respective textual commands. The Court
viewed the more fluid textual command contained in the Im-
port-Export Clause as focusing not upon the goods being bur-
dened, but rather upon the nature of the burden imposed.
Thus, because that text distinguished between types of burdens
rather than prohibiting all burdens, it was necessary for the
Court to determine which burdens were prohibited. Given the
specificity of the words used in the text, it appears that the
Court adopted an approach which identified the Framers' ex-
pectations and, in doing so, outlined the concerns the Framers
sought to address.240
As previously discussed, the government in IBM claimed
that to determine whether the Export Clause prohibited a tax,
the court should examine the Import-Export Clause factors dis-
cussed in Washington Stevedoring.241 Further, the government
argued that there was no meaningful difference between a tax
on the proceeds of stevedoring services and a tax on premiums
paid for policies of casualty insurance, a transaction that the
government described as being incidental to the process of ex-
porting. The government argued that the tax was nondiscrimi-
natory because it did not discriminate against exports, i.e., the
tax did not target exports as exports.242 Instead the tax was
generally applied on insurance policies written by foreign in-
surers regardless of whether the insured goods were in the ex-
port stream. Therefore the government concluded the tax did
not run afoul of the Export Clause. 243
240. Additionally, Washington Stevedoring noted the textual differences
between the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause, namely that the
Commerce Clause reaches all taxation and regulation of commerce while the
Import-Export Clause only addresses imposts or duties. Moreover, Washing-
ton Stevedoring noted that the Import-Export Clause states an absolute ban,
whereas the Commerce Clause merely grants power to Congress. See 435 U.S.
at 751.
241. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 852. The Import-Export Clause involves (i) con-
cern that an impost or duty might interfere with the federal government's
regulation of commercial relations with foreign governments; (ii) fear that on
account of such state taxation the federal government would lose an important
source of revenue; and (iii) a desire to maintain harmony among the states,
which would be disturbed if seaboard states could tax goods "merely flowing
through their ports" to other states not so favorably situated. Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976).
242. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 850.
243. The government failed to argue, and the Supreme Court's majority
opinion failed to address, whether the portion of Thames & Mersey which held
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Moreover, the government argued that a narrowing of the
prohibition of the Import-Export Clause required a similar shift
in the Export Clause analysis.2" Additionally, the IBM Court
rejected the government's claim that the Import-Export Clause
case Washington Stevedoring governed cases arising under the
Export Clause. Rather than focusing on the nature of the tax,
IBM relied upon Thames & Mersey, holding that the Export
Clause bans all taxes or duties on the process of exportation.
The Thames & Mersey Court found that to determine if a tax
violates the Export Clause it examines whether "the tax... [is]
so... closely related to the 'process of exporting' that the tax is
in substance a tax upon the exportation and hence within the
constitutional prohibition[.] "245 In IBM, the Court explained
that the parties were in agreement that § 4371 imposes "a 'tax'
on the goods themselves. 2 46 The IBM Court noted that it did
not read Washington Stevedoring as overruling Thames & Mer-
sey, and, therefore, it would follow established precedent. The
Court stated that:
[m]eaningful textual differences that should not be overlooked exist
between the Export Clause and the Import-Export Clause. In finding
the assessments in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages... and Department
of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos.... valid,
the Court recognized that the Import-Export Clause's absolute ban on
'Imposts or Duties' is not a ban on every tax.
247
The Court found that the terms "impost" and "duty" were
narrower than the term "tax" and thus a particular state as-
sessment may be beyond the Import-Export Clause's reach,
while an identical federal assessment might be subject to the
Export Clause. 248 The Court continued:
The distinction between imposts or duties and taxes is especially per-
tinent in light of the peculiar definitional analysis we chose in Mich-
elin. Finding substantial ambiguity in the phrase "Imposts or Du-
ties," we "decline[d] to presume it was intended to embrace taxation
that taxing marine insurance policies was the same as taxing goods, was still
good law. The dissent criticized the Court's failure to revisit the holding in
Thames & Mersey with regard to this issue. See id. at 863-64. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). See generally discussion infra Part V.B. The majority's failure to
address whether a tax on marine insurance policies was truly a tax laid on ar-
ticles exported was a mistake which we believe further frustrates the search
for a principled definition of the Export Clause prohibition in the case law.
244. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 857.
245. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 25
(1914).
246. IBM, 517 U.S. at 855.
247. Id. at 844.
248. See id. at 857.
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that does not create the evils the Clause was specifically intended to
eliminate." We entirely bypassed the etymological inquiry into the
proper meaning of the terms "impost" and "duty," and instead created
a regime in which those terms are conclusions to be drawn from an
examination into whether a particular assessment "was the type of
exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the Framers of the
Constitution." We are not prepared to say that the word "Tax" is "suf-
ficiently ambiguous," that we may ignore its common, and usually ex-
pansive, meaning in favor of an Export Clause decisional rule in
which a tax is not a "Tax" unless it discriminates against exports.
Consequently, Michelin and Washington Stevedoring, which held that
the assessments in question were not "Imposts or Duties" at all, do
not logically validate the assessment at issue in this case, which, by
all accounts, remains a "Tax.2 49
Justice Thomas seemed content, therefore, to reaffirm
Fairbank and its progeny, emphasizing that mere protection
from discrimination was not the goal of the Export Clause and
thereby distinguishing the significance of Import-Export Clause
jurisprudence. Moreover, Justice Thomas made clear that the
textual differences between the two Clauses prohibited the use
of Import-Export Clause analysis to interpret the scope of the
Export Clause.
IBM emphasized the purpose of the Export Clause, that is,
the prevention of any burden being placed on exports.250 How-
ever, it did not go far enough in providing a positive formula-
tion of that which Justice Thomas calls "export taxes." The
user fee exception argument was not before the Court as it was
dropped by the IRS at the C.F.C. Further, Justice Thomas (de-
spite complaints from Justice Kennedy in the dissent) failed to
re-examine the portion of the holding in Thames & Mersey that
marine insurance policies were "inextricably" tied to exports.
Thus, although a rejection of the Import-Export Clause analy-
sis was clear, the Court offered no useful enunciation of an Ex-
port Clause standard. The closest Justice Thomas came was in
the following statement regarding the Export Clause: "It spe-
cifically prohibits Congress from regulating international com-
merce through export taxes, [and] disallows any attempt to
raise federal revenue from exports. 2 51
249. Id. at 858 (citations omitted).
250. See id. at 859.
251. Id.
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IV. INTERPRETATIVE METHODOLOGIES FOR CREATING
A POSITIVE EXPORT CLAUSE STANDARD
We believe that an Export Clause standard can be posi-
tively enunciated, despite the Court's failure to do so in IBM
and U.S. Shoe. Our proposed standard is derived from the text
of the Export Clause, as well as the principles and policies
which underlie it. In IBM, the Court indicated that the mean-
ing of the Export Clause should be constructed according to a
text-based interpretation which focuses on its own text, rather
than looking past these words to other influences, such as de-
velopments in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.252 A
text-based approach constructs a definition of the words in
question by means of the words themselves, as well as the
structure and the context in which they are placed.253 The ac-
tual words of the Export Clause provide for a ban on all bur-
dens placed by Congress on exports regardless of the purpose of
the exaction.254 Despite IBM's apparent preference to restrict
its analysis to the text alone, we find that looking beyond the
text to the principles, policies and history underlying the Ex-
port Clause fosters an interpretation which, in fact, confirms
and supports the textual interpretation. The resulting inter-
pretation will help courts identify an Export Clause standard.
More importantly, formulating a definition reveals how the
seeming conflict between the Export Clause and the Commerce
Clause may be avoided.
Given the nature and clarity of the text and principles em-
bodied in the Export Clause, we do not feel that it is necessary
to advocate one interpretive methodology over another. How-
ever, as the text provides a reasonable interpretation of the
Export Clause, uncontradicted by interpretations under other
methodologies, we believe the textual approach is at least a
good place to start. Further, it appears that when courts have
interpreted the Export Clause, they have struggled to construct
252. See id. at 852. See generally George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism,
75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 385 (1995) (discussing structural textualism).
253. The text-based approach we propose recognizes that textualism incor-
porates concepts and influences beyond the words. As one commentator notes
"[tiextualism cannot neglect the cultural, political, and ideological impinge-
ments on the production and interpretation of meaning." Taylor, supra note
252, at 325. Moreover, this approach recognizes that any methodology to a
certain extent is self-legitimizing. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
233-40 (1982); Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797, 832 (1982).
254. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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the meaning from the text, recognizing a textual methodology
as appropriate2 55 Thus, the purpose of this Article is not to ad-
vocate any particular methodology in general, but to simply ar-
ticulate what the Court has been grasping at in Export Clause
jurisprudence.
A. A TEXT-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE EXPORT CLAUSE
A text-based interpretation of the Export Clause extracts a
reasonable standard by turning initially to textualism as an in-
terpretive methodology. Textualism presumably focuses on the
text alone, recognizing the range of meaning of the words
themselves and construing those words reasonably.2 6 Justice
Scalia argues that textualism "should not be confused with so-
called strict constructionism... text should not be construed
strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be
construed reasonably."257 Inherent in such a command is the
acknowledgment that words have a limited and identifiable
range of meaning.258 Any serious identification of a "range of
meaning," however, must go beyond the free standing words
themselves and consider the structure and context in which
those words are uttered.259 Thus, a textual interpretation
should not attempt to simply "discover" meaning, but rather to
"construct" meaning, by starting with the text.260 Of course, as
will be discussed below, constructing the meaning of any text
poses dangers as the construction tools themselves influence
the final result.261
Constructing the meaning of the Export Clause requires
courts to focus on the words "no tax or duty" and 'laid on Arti-
cles exported." As discussed above, the Court has consistently
read these two phrases as prohibiting all exactions which are
tied to an exported article by virtue of being calculated with
255. See, e.g., Fairbankv. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 288 (1901).
256. See ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 23-24 (1997).
257. Id.
258. See id. at 24; see also Taylor, supra note 252, at 341 ('In contrast to
standard views of literalism and plain meaning, textualism does not evaluate
the meaning of contested statutory terms in isolation, totally acontextually.").
259. See Taylor, supra note 252, at 342-43.
260. "To unfold the world of a text may be very different from articulating
its supposed rule. '[Mleaning must be constructed-it is not given in the writ-
ten signs.. . .'" Id. at 354 (quoting Paul Ricoeur, Construing and Construct-
ing, TIMEs LITERARY SuPP., Feb. 25, 1977, at 216).
261. See Schauer, supra note 253, at 818.
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reference to such an article or its exportation process. The
Court has traced this simple definition to the words them-
selves. No "tax or duty" signifies a ban against all exactions
rather than a limited range of exactions that might be connoted
by more specific words such as "imposts or duties."2 62 Moreo-
ver, the Supreme Court recognized that the phrase "taxes or
duties" relates to all exactions that in any way burden ex-
ports.263
Furthermore, the phrase "laid on articles exported" re-
quires that the exaction be connected to the exports in some
significant way.264 The word "laid" connotes an exaction which
is physically upon the goods. Since a purely physical or per
unit measure could easily be circumvented, a meaningful inter-
pretation of the clause must account for exactions indirectly
laid on the goods by virtue of being calculated pursuant to any
attribute of the goods, or the exportation process itself.265
Moreover, the phrase "articles exported" seems to suggest that
the physical connection of the exaction must occur at a par-
ticular temporal point, namely when they are in the process of
exportation. 266
The Supreme Court recognized the validity of a textual ap-
proach and issued a clear mandate that the broad language of
the Export Clause excludes a fluid analysis. In IBM, the Court
explicitly stated its position for a textual analysis of the Export
Clause:
Our decades-long struggle over the meaning of the nontextual nega-
tive command of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead to the
conclusion that our interpretation of the textual command of the Ex-
port Clause is equally fluid. At one time, the Court may have thought
262. See United States v. IBM Corp, 517 U.S. 843, 847, 857 (1996)
("[Impost and duty are narrower terms than tax."); see also MADISON, supra
note 70, at 466 ("D]uties are applicable to many objects to which the word im-
posts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former ex-
tend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties.").
263. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 847-48.
264. See id. at 846. When the Supreme Court has "interpret[ed] the lan-
guage of the Export Clause ... [it has] broadly exempted from federal taxation
not only export goods, but also services and activities closely related to the ex-
port process." Id. "It would be a strange rule of construction that language
granting powers is to be liberally construed, and that language of restriction is
to be narrowly and technically construed." Fairbank v. United States, 181
U.S. 283, 289 (1901).
265. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290-91.
266. See, e.g., Win. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 173-75 (1918)
(finding that the income tax on net profits was levied after the process of ex-
portation and thus did not violate the Export Clause).
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that the dormant Commerce Clause required a strict ban on state
taxation of interstate commerce, but the text did not require that
view.... The text of the Export Clause, on the other hand, expressly
prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports. These tex-
tual disparities strongly suggest that shifts in the Court's view of the
scope of the dormant Commerce Clause should not, and indeed can-
not, govern our interpretation of the Export Clause. 267
The Court makes the point that the Export Clause (as dispa-
rate from the Commerce Clause) contains the blueprint for its
own textual interpretation: its plain language can be seen as
contradicting the use of a nontextual methodology. In fact, this
has been the view of the Court since the beginning of its Export
Clause interpretation that "[the true spirit of constitutional in-
terpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construc-
tion to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit
and purpose."268
B. SUPPORTING INTERPRETATIVE SOURCES
The examination of the creation of the Export Clause sup-
ports our formulation of an Export Clause ban on exactions
placed on the exports themselves during the course of exporta-
tion. An examination of the history and purpose of the Export
Clause justifies a standard which removes exports from any
type of political gamesmanship by Congress. This historical
approach is often grouped with the "original understanding"
approach under the heading of originalism; however, the two
approaches are distinct forms of interpretation.269 The histori-
cal, intent-based approach requires constitutional interpreta-
tion based on the historical investigation of the intent of the
Framers and ratifiers.270 On the other hand, the "original un-
derstanding" approach (also often contained under the um-
brella of textualism) bases its interpretation on the public un-
derstanding of language at the time of enactment. 271 Intent
theory reasons that "the historically demonstrable intentions of
the framers" is a "normative guide" to the Constitution's
267. IBM, 517 U.S. at 851-52 (citations omitted).
268. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 289.
269. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 COLUNI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1997).
270. See id.
271. See id. at 12-13, n. 47. The historical evidence used to determine the
Framers' intent, e.g., Records of the Constitutional Convention, can also be
considered "strong evidence of how relevant language would have been under-
stood by the ratifiers and the public generally." Id.
1999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 84:129
meaning,272 as it represents "past, publicly accountable acts"
accepted under "historically established norms. 2 73 For exam-
ple, at a time when "intentionalism in the modern sense
reigned supreme in the rhetoric of constitutional interpreta-
tion, 12 74 one Senator explained: "'Every Constitution embodies
the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds.
If its meaning in any place is open to doubt.., we cannot err if
we turn to the framers .... '"275 Critics of the intent theory,
however, point out that it is difficult to attribute one intent to a
group of individuals, because there will always be "specific is-
sues that some members never considered and as to which oth-
ers may actually have diverged," thereby leaving too much lati-
tude for the interpreter's predilections or prejudices.2 76
Investigation into the Framers' intent with respect to the
Export Clause reinforces that the text is the best reflection of
their intent.277 James Madison reported 278 that the Constitu-
tion's Framers insisted on a complete ban against taxes on ex-
ports, in part due to concerns that such taxes would discourage
industry and would prevent uniformity as a result of differing
272. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 886 (1985) (discussing W. CROSSKEY & W. JEFFREY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1980); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-
14 (1980); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1981)).
273. Fallon, supra note 269, at 11.
274. Powell, supra note 272, at 947. Intentionalism in the modern sense of
historical investigation of Framers' private intentions, did not appear until the
1820s, and came into full force by the outbreak of the Civil War. See id. at
945-47. This arose as a result of many factors, including increased adoption of
modern private intent concepts in other areas of law and the increased avail-
ability of historical materials regarding the constitutional enactment. See id.
275. Id. at 947 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866)
(speech of Sen. Charles Sumner)).
276. Fallon, supra note 269, at 13; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 313-17 (1986).
277. It could be argued that the consistency between the legislative history
and the text is not surprising as the text is unambiguous and thus it is really
unnecessary to look any further than the text. However, the C.I.T.'s and the
C.A.F.C.'s investigation of Commerce Clause precedent under an Export
Clause case demonstrates an apparent ambiguity requiring investigation un-
der this theory. See supra Part I.B.
278. Admittedly, some have criticized Madison's account of the Constitu-
tional Convention as propaganda. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lec-
tures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1017-18 (1984).
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produce among the States.279 In fact, the Framers were acutely
aware of the possible long-term implications of the Export
Clause yet still chose to adopt it in its broadest form. At the
Convention of 1787, a series of proposals to limit the breadth
and severity of the Export Clause were specifically rejected.280
One of these proposals-to restrict the Export Clause's applica-
tion only to taxes whose purpose was raising revenue-was re-
jected, seeming to indicate that interpretation of the Export
Clause should not produce a restrictive ban. Although the spe-
cific characterization of a government exaction as a fee rather
than a tax (as they are presently distinguished) did not exist at
the Constitutional Convention, a modification of the general
prohibition which would have allowed for the imposition of fees
was raised and rejected at that time.28' Interestingly, another
proposal which directly addressed the issue presented over 200
years later in U.S. Shoe-to limit the Export Clause's scope in
case regulation of exports could someday be deemed necessary
by Congress-was considered and rejected.282
In addition to an intent based or historical approach, an-
other methodology examined283 suggests the consideration of
279. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 498. Additionally, the Export Clause
was intended to give the Southern States assurance that the Northern States,
through their power in the federal government, would not impose a burden of
taxation on the Southern States. See id.
280. See id. at 499-503.
281. See id. Madison's suggestion that "[a] proper regulation of exports
may & probably will be necessary hereafter, and for the same purposes as the
regulation of imports; viz, for revenue-domestic manufactures-and procur-
ing equitable regulations from other nations" was ultimately disregarded in
favor of a complete prohibition of taxes on exports. Id. at 499-500.
282. See id. at 499-503. Other proposals considered and rejected included
requests for exemption of enumerated articles from export taxes and provi-
sions for imposition of an export tax subject to a super-majority vote of Con-
gress. "The power of taxing exports may be inconvenient at present; but it
must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit it with respect to all articles and
for ever." Id. at 499.
283. We will utilize as the example of principle-based theory Ronald
Dworkin's "law as integrity," developed throughout his works into a "system-
atic and articulate statement and defense of the powerful theory of law and
legal interpretation." Jeffrie G. Murphy, Book Note, 15 POL. THEORY 669,
669-73 (1987) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 276). This was selected be-
cause it has the greatest possibility of application. Other principle-based
theories are based on the existence of extra-textual fundamental rights under
natural law. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20, 71-
76 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 39, 48-54 (1980).
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the Framers' more abstract convictions. 284 These more abstract
principles can be ascertained from the language and structure
of the Constitution.285 This mode of interpretation looks to the
text of the Constitution to extrapolate more abstract principles,
derived from the interpreter's understanding of what the
Framers "intended-or expected or hoped-would be the conse-
quence" of the document. 286 The principle-based methodology
differs from the textual approach, which represents "concrete or
dated rules" that reflect what the Framers "intended to say in
enacting the language they used."287 It also differs from the
more literal historical approach which studies the stated intent
of the drafter.
When applied to the Export Clause, this principle-based
approach reinforces the results of the textual and historical ap-
proaches. In fact, from the language and structure of the Ex-
port Clause, it is evident that the Framers sought to embody, in
the broadly drafted text of the Export Clause, the abstract
principles of promoting exports and protecting them from any
politically-motivated and discriminatory exactions. The Fram-
ers intended the consequences of the Export Clause to result in
a reading of the Export Clause which would broadly protect ex-
ports from political maneuvering. Since the Framers consid-
ered numerous, more limited constructions for the text and re-
jected them, it would be contradictory for an evolving judicial
reading of the Export Clause to permit scenarios the Framers
explicitly discussed and rejected as undesirable. 288 Thus, the
284. See DWORKIN, supra note 276, at 316-17.
285. See id. at 313-17.
286. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 116 (Antonin Scalia ed., 1997). This ap-
proach does not undertake an actual historic analysis of the intentions of the
Framers. For a separate discussion of intent-based views, see supra notes
269-76 and accompanying text.
287. Dworkin, supra note 286, at 116. The theory of ascribed intent also
differs from a historicist intent-based theory, in which historical research is
undertaken to determine what the Framers actually intended. See discussion
supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
288. This investigation of original intent reflects a historicist approach, so
its implications for the Export Clause are not surprising. Scholars have ac-
knowledged that "[tihe common law poses an obvious problem for the histori-
cist" interpreters, who generally contend that "it is unacceptable for judges
and justices to develop constitutional law on a common law model." Fallon,
supra note 269, at 12 n.44. But see SCALIA, supra note 256, at 139-40 (stating
that stare decisis is a compromise of all philosophies of interpretation, so that
"what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in
the interest of stability"); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
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extrapolation of principles from the Export Clause formulates a
broad prohibition, paralleling the broadly formulated textual
command.
The investigation into the creation of the Export Clause,
including both the explicit and extrapolated policy goals of the
Framers, indicates the creation of a broad mandate in the Ex-
port Clause. In addition, these considerations apply with equal
force today. Therefore, the broad, clear Export Clause standard
we have developed is supported by the textual approach to the
Export Clause suggested by the Court in IBM, as well as the
intent and principles embodied in the clause.
V. AN EXPORT CLAUSE STANDARD
A clear Export Clause standard can be derived from the
text of the Export Clause as well as the intent and principles
behind it. The Export Clause precedents have, in fact, recog-
nized a clear and complete ban.289 When revealed and articu-
lated, this standard provides a workable definition of Export
Clause exactions. Using this definition as a guide, Congress
and the courts may enable the Commerce Clause to ameliorate
market failures, accounting for any externalities, without run-
ning afoul of the Export Clause.
As a result of the foregoing analysis, we have developed a
two prong test which delineates the scope of the Export Clause
prohibition. We have developed the test from the text of the
Export Clause and the cases interpreting it. Our definition
evolves from a text-based approach, and we believe it comports
with the purpose of the Export Clause as envisioned by the
Framers. Further, we believe that this definition complements
principled understandings of permissible exactions under the
Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause. Our test
questions whether an exaction:
1) arises during the process of exportation;2 90 and
CIN. L. REV. 849, 863-65 (1989) (discussing faint-hearted originalists).
289. See supra Part III.A.
290. For a tax to be prohibited by the Export Clause, the article which it
burdens must begin the process of exportation either legally or temporally.
See A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1923) (holding that
a general property tax laid upon baseball bats within the course of exportation
violates the constitutional prohibition); Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507
(1886) (holding that a general tax laid upon all cigarettes, not levied on the
cigarettes in the course of exportation, does not violate the constitutional pro-
hibition); United States v. Gosho Co., 23 F.2d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1928) (holding
that a transportation tax applied to cotton in the process of exportation,
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2) is calculated based upon the export or the process of ex-
portation.291
This two-prong test will effectively protect against direct and
indirect burdens upon exports without perpetually relieving the
goods from the ordinary burdens of taxation.
A. No USER FEE EXCEPTION
There is nothing in the text, case law or history of the Ex-
port Clause which suggests that there is a user fee exception to
its broad prohibition. Textually, the Clause prohibits all taxes
or duties laid on articles exported from any state. The phrase
"tax or duty" encompasses all exactions. First, as discussed in
the Import-Export Clause cases, as well as in IBM, the terms
themselves cast the widest possible net. Unlike "impost or du-
ties", the phrase "tax or duty" reaches beyond charges for par-
ticular purposes. Moreover, the phrase is modified by the
words: "laid upon Articles exported." Thus, it is defined in
terms of how it is calculated without regard to the purpose of
the exaction.
The Court in U.S. Shoe indicated that it intended to disre-
gard non-Export Clause precedent, in favor of an Export Clause
analysis rooted in its own text and precedent.292 Yet, the Court
then went on to inquire whether the HMT could fall into the
user fee exception of the Export Clause. As there is no mention
of a user fee exception in the Export Clause or its case law (or
any words that would even remotely hint at such an excep-
tion),293 it would appear that the Court implicitly adopted
Commerce Clause precedent to create one.294 That is, the Court
though temporarily stopped, violated the Export Clause).
291. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 312 (1901) (stating that
an exaction upon bills of lading taxed exports directly); Pace v. Burgess, 92
U.S. 372, 375 (1875) (holding that a stamp to be affixed to exported tobacco
was not a tax because it bore no proportion whatsoever to the quantity or
value of the package to which it was affixed). See generally Thames & Mersey
Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1914); United States v. Hvoslef,
237 U.S. 1 (1914).
292. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 368 (1998).
293. Presumably, one could argue that the Export Clause prohibition only
relates to taxes or duties and thus does not encompass "fees." Obviously, Con-
gress cannot circumvent the Export Clause through mere nominal characteri-
zation. Thus, it is appropriate to isolate the charges prohibited by the lan-
guage. The language captures all exactions and provides for no exceptions-
regardless of how they are nominally characterized.
294. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (stating the authors'
belief that the Court's reliance upon Pace for the creation of the user fee excep-
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adopted the concept created in Commerce Clause precedent and
read it into the interpretation of a long-standing Export Clause
case, Pace.295 This resulted in an anachronistic interpretation
of the Pace decision. In other words, the Court read Pace as if
it were written after the development of Commerce Power user
fee jurisprudence. Pace cannot reflect the Post New Deal com-
merce power understandings, as it was decided long before
those understandings evolved.
The adoption of Commerce Clause user fee analysis was
not only beyond the text of the Export Clause, but it also con-
tradicted the instructions of earlier Export Clause precedent.
Fairbank stated that the broad limitation imposed by the Ex-
port Clause could not be circumvented by nominally imposing a
tax upon exports under another constitutional grant of
power.296 As noted in Fairbank, this broad prohibition not only
derives directly from the text, but also reflects the intention of
the Framers.297 Further, IBM specifically rejected the adoption
of non-Export Clause precedent.298
Additionally, the Commerce Clause precedent has estab-
lished that the Commerce Clause is limited by the other consti-
tutional limitations.299 The Commerce Clause, as delineated by
the Framers, is a grant of power which allows Congress discre-
tion in the methods it uses in implementing policies. 300 How-
ever, this discretion is not, and should not be, unlimited: the
methods chosen must still conform to other general limitations
created by the Framers' restrictions set forth throughout the
Constitution.301 The power to regulate under the Commerce
tion is inadequate).
295. See Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1875).
296. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 289 (1901).
We are not here confronted with a question of the extent of the pow-
ers of Congress but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution
on its action... [wihere prohibition or limitation is placed upon the
power of Congress that prohibition or limitation should be enforced in
its spirit and to its entirety.
Id. at 288-89.
297. See id. at 287-88.
298. See United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859 (1996).
299. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462-63 (1978).
300. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1995).
301. See North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 393 (1940); see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
119 (1942); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 345
(1893); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974);
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Clause is as limited by the restraints of the Export Clause, as it
is by the restraints of the Bill of Rights. 302 The Supreme Court
stated:
For nearly one hundred and twenty-five years, this Court has recog-
nized that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is "the
power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is
to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and ac-
knowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitu-
tion."... This is not to say, of course, that Congress is an absolute
sovereign. It is limited by express provisions in other parts of the
Constitution, such as § 9 of Article I and the Bill of Rights.30 3
With regard to an Export Clause analysis, the distinction
between a Taxing Power and a Commerce Clause exaction, i.e.,
between a tax and a user fee, is unclear and unnecessary. In
fact, the Court's identification of a user fee exception to the Ex-
port Clause is a result of its failure to take into account the text
and history of the Export Clause. This misinterpretation of the
clause, in conjunction with its misinterpretation of Pace in the
same vein, turns on its failure to recognize the significance of
the phrase "laid on articles exported." Pace identified a tax
which was not "laid on articles exported." The Court, in U.S.
Shoe, using later-developed and inapplicable precedent, mis-
read this as identifying a user fee. The consequence of this
misinterpretation is U.S. Shoe's fallacious proposition: the ex-
emption of a user fee (which in the Commerce Clause sense is
an exaction charged on a service), from the Export Clause pro-
hibition of taxes on goods (i.e., the prohibited taxes are those
"laid on articles exported").
In sum, many factors point toward a disregard for Com-
merce Clause user fee precedent when interpreting the Export
Clause, in favor of a clearer Export Clause standard. These
factors include: interpretation of the text itself, the adherence
to specific Export Clause precedent, the honoring of the clause's
underlying principles, and the significance of the Supreme
Court's ruling in IBM. The standard proposed in this Article
attempts to follow these indications and provide clear guidance
for future interpretation. Each prong of the proposed standard
Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994-95 (6th Cir. 1943); United States
v. Evans, 712 F. Supp. 1435, 1441 (D. Mont. 1989); Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (N.D. Ill.
1982); In re Electric Bond & Share Co., 73 F. Supp. 426, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
302. See North Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 704.
303. Id. at 704-05 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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acknowledges the coherence of the textual phrase "tax or duty
laid on articles exported," and then relies on direct Export
Clause precedent in its interpretation. This approach avoids
the mistake made in U.S. Shoe, of parsing apart the phrase
"tax or duty," and interpreting it out of context and based on
inapplicable conceptual precedent, thereby causing unneces-
sary reliance on the inapplicable Commerce Clause concept of a
user fee.
B. A TAX OR DUTY LAiD UPON ARTICLES EXPORTED
The text of the Export Clause itself defines the scope of the
constitutional mandate as prohibiting only (and all) taxes or
duties "laid on articles exported." Thus, the text defines its pa-
rameters by reference to the goods being exported. For the Ex-
port Clause to have any meaning at all, its prohibition must re-
strict the ability of Congress to burden exports directly or
indirectly.304 At the same time, this protection is not meant to
exempt exports from "ordinary burdens of taxation" which are
by definition not "laid on articles exported."30 5 The Supreme
Court has faltered in defining the phrase "tax or duty laid on
articles exported." In doing so, it has failed to fully articulate
what is prohibited by the Export Clause. Consequently, it has
mistakenly resorted to the user fee distinction to articulate
what is permitted under the Export Clause.
With regard to the nature of the exactions prohibited by
the Export Clause, the text bans all exactions. 30 6 No "tax or
duty" signifies a ban against all exactions, rather than the lim-
ited range of exactions that more specific words such as "im-
posts or duties" might connote. 30 7 Modifications of the general
prohibition which would allow for "fees" were raised and re-
jected at the Constitutional Convention. 308 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court itself has recognized the breadth of this prohibi-
tion.309
The Export Clause cannot protect goods from governmen-
tal burdens unless those goods are "articles exported." Charac-
304. See Fairbankv. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 296 (1901).
305. A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69 (1923).
306. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290.
307. "[Impost and duty are narrower terms than tax." United States v.
IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 857 (1996); accord United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 65-67 (1936).
308. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 499-503.
309. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 848, 859-60; Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290.
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terizing goods as "articles exported" creates a temporal label.
Accordingly, to ascertain the meaning of this phrase, courts
have properly focused on whether the articles are "in the proc-
ess of exportation."310 "Articles exported," as a temporal classi-
fication, suggests both a beginning and an end to the classifica-
tion. Thus, Export Clause cases have understood the Export
Clause not to excuse articles from exactions when those goods
are not in the process of exportation. 311 Such exactions falling
outside the temporal parameters were labeled by the Court as
"ordinary burdens of taxation."312
The Supreme Court has commented that the term "export"
is the same for the Import-Export Clause as it is for the Export
Clause, and explained that an "export" is something that has
entered the "stream of export."313 Thus, in Empresa Siderur-
gica, an Import-Export Clause case involving a challenge to a
state property tax, the Court set forth the following definition:
it is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a plan which con-
templates exportation, or an integrated series of events which will
end with it. The tax immunity runs to the process of exportation and
the transactions and documents embraced in it. Delivery of packages
to an exporting carrier for shipment abroad and the delivery of oil
into the hold of the ship furnished by the foreign purchaser to carry
the oil abroad have been held sufficient. It is the entiance of the arti-
cles into the export stream that marks the start of the process of ex-
portation. Then there is certainty that the goods are headed for their
foreign destination and will not be diverted to domestic use. Nothing
less will suffice.
14
Thus, the temporal start of the exportation triggers the protec-
tion of the Export Clause against a tax or duty laid upon the
article. 315 Moreover, when the exportation has ceased, the Ex-
port Clause protection ceases as well.
310. A.G. Spalding., 262 U.S. at 68-69; accord Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S.
504, 507 (1886).
311. See A.G. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 68-69; Win. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247
U.S. 165, 174 (1918); Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 426 (1904).
312. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427.
313. Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154, 156 (1949);
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 83 (1946).
314. Empresa Siderurgica, 337 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted). See gen-
erally Richfield Oil Corp., 329 U.S. 69; A.G. Spalding, 262 U.S. 66; Thames &
Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915); United States v.
Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1914); Cornell, 192 U.S. 418; Fairbank, 181 U.S. 283;
Turpin, 117 U.S. 504.
315. Interestingly, this requirement that the goods be in the process of ex-
portation in order to claim the immunity appears to be an alternative justifica-
tion for the Court's decision in Pace. The goods in Pace had not entered the
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Maintaining a constant and reliable understanding of what
is the process of exportation and when it starts and ends is es-
sential to capturing a workable Export Clause formula. The
straightforward Empresa definition may not be up to the task.
Empresa defines when property has left the state such that it
may no longer be subject to property taxes, however, it fails to
address taxes which fall upon the process of exportation rather
than on property. Nor does it adequately address excise taxes
or sales taxes. Fairbank, Hvoslef, Thames & Mersey, and IBM
all involved taxes on the process of exportation and seem to in-
dicate that a tax on the process of exportation, by definition,
falls within the temporal limitation. The harder question
arises when an excise tax or tax on a sale falls upon articles ex-
ported. A.G. Spalding invalidated a tax on goods in a ware-
house where the tax accrued on the sale for export and the sale
for export committed the goods to the carrier for export.316
Turpin refused to invalidate a tax on goods in a warehouse be-
cause it was not clear that the goods would in fact be ex-
ported.317 Peck held that an income tax on net profits accrued
after the exportation process had ceased and thus was not sub-
ject to an Export Clause ban.318 Depending upon the exaction
in question, the various factors may need to be considered to
determine whether the export process has begun and whether
it has ended.319
Once the nature of the prohibited exactions and the win-
dow of protection is established, the remaining inquiry is what
protection is afforded. The only limitation on the prohibition is
export stream when the exaction was levied. As the Court pointed out in its
latter decision of Turpin, involving nearly identical facts as Pace:
A general tax, laid on all property alike, and not levied on goods in
course of exportation... is not within the constitutional prohibi-
tion .... In the present case, the tax (ifit was a tax) was laid upon the
goods before they had left the factory. They were not in [the] course
of exportation; they might never be exported ....
Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507.
316. See AG. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 70; cf. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427 (stating
that a manufacturing tax on cheese committed to export may accrue on goods
in the process of exportation).
317. See Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507.
318. See Win. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 175 (1918).
319. A thorough examination of the temporal parameters of "export" within
the meaning of the Export Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. Given
the variety of exactions which may arise and the various contexts that are
possible, we would suggest that the Empresa Siderurgica approach is merely a
starting point.
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that it must be "laid on articles exported."320 The foregoing
phrase not only connotes a temporal element of the definition,
it also connotes a physical element to the definition.321 Exac-
tions must be connected to (laid on) the articles exported. Con-
necting an exaction to an article occurs when the exaction is
derived from the article-when the exaction is calculated with
reference to the article. The articles, however, incorporate a
variety of attributes: weight, value, shape, size and amount.
Thus, where the amount of a charge is calculated by such an
attribute-value, quantity, weight or size of an export-the ex-
action could be said to be "laid on the article exported." In A. G.
Spalding, the Court invalidated a tax based upon the value of
the exported articles.322 The tax in U.S. Shoe offended the Ex-
port Clause because it was based upon the value of the articles
exported.323
It is not difficult to imagine that in some instances sepa-
rate documents may represent the exports such that a tax on
320. To some extent the questions of whether a tax relates to the process of
exportation and whether it is "on the goods" are somewhat related. Where an
exaction is calculated without reference to the goods it would seem likely that
the exaction would also not be related to the process of exportation. See, e.g.,
Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507; Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1875).
321. The importance of the term "laid" as connoting a physical attachment
to the goods is significant, as a physical attachment may not necessarily be
dispositive in determining the existence of a tax when other constitutional
limitations are concerned. In fact, in Fairbank the Court pointed to Nicol v.
Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899), to explain that when a tax fell on something other
than the goods, it was to be a "direct tax" subject to the rule of apportionment.
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 293 (1901). In Nicol, the Court con-
sidered a stamp duty which required a tax "[ulpon each sale, agreement of
sale, or agreement to sell, any products or merchandise at any exchange, or
board of trade, or other similar place, either for present or future deliv-
ery .... " Id. (citing Nicol, 173 U.S. at 509). The Court in Fairbank noted:
We sustained that tax as a tax upon the privilege or facilities ob-
tained by dealings on exchange, saying: "A tax upon the privilege of
selling property at the exchange and of thus using the facilities there
offered in accomplishing the sale differs radically from a tax upon
every sale made in any place. The latter tax is really and practically
upon property."
Id. (quoting Nicol, 173 U.S. at 521). The tax in Nicol was placed on the value
of the merchandise sold at the Chicago exchange. See id.
322. The statute under attack in A.G. Spalding provided that "there shall
be levied... [ulpon all ... baseball bats [and] ... balls of all kinds... sold by
the manufacturer.., a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for
which so sold." A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 285 F. 784, 785 (1922),
rev'd, 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
323. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369
(1998) ("[T]he HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis.").
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the documents would be a tax on the exports themselves.
These documents would stand in place of the exports when they
are essential to some other element of the exportation process
(e.g., bills of lading or export visas).324 In Fairbank, the Court
struck down a flat tax on bills of lading because a bill of lading
was necessary for each export shipment, and thus the tax was a
per shipment tax on exports.325 Likewise, in Hvoslef, the Court
struck down a tax imposed upon charter parties for export, as
such a tax was directly on the exportation process.326
Once again, maintaining a constant and reliable under-
standing of the scope of the process of exportation is essential
to a workable Export Clause standard. Certainly, the process
of exportation extends beyond the mere physical goods. Yet the
connection to the process cannot be so derivative as to reach
exactions which are not "laid," temporally at least, during the
process of exportation.327 In attempting to capture the entire
exportation process within the constitutional prohibition, the
Court has sometimes "linked" private services (e.g., the service
of providing insurance) to the process of exportation. The
Court has linked services to the process of exportation by sub-
jectively determining that a service is "inextricably tied" to the
exportation process. 328
Thus, in Thames & Mersey, the plaintiff brought an action
to recover the amount paid as stamp taxes upon policies in-
suring certain exports against marine risks. The Supreme
Court inquired whether the tax was "so directly and closely re-
lated to the 'process of exporting' that the tax was in substance
a tax upon the exportation and hence within the constitutional
prohibition[]" 3J 2 9 The Court held that the insurance upon goods
was such a necessity upon exportation that a tax upon such
324. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290-93.
325. See id. at 293-94 (citing Almy v. California, 65 U.S. 169, 174 (1860)).
"A bill of lading... is invariably associated with every cargo of merchandise
exported ... and consequently a duty upon that is, in substance and effect, a
duty on the article exported." Id. at 294.
326. See United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 17 (1914) ("The charters were
for the exportation; they related to it exclusively; they serve no other purpose.
A tax on these charter parties was in substance a tax on the exportation; and a
tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.").
327. See Win. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174 (1918).
328. See Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19,
26 (1915).
329. Id. at 25.
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policies was, in effect, a tax upon the goods themselves and as
such, a violation of the Export Clause. 330
However, we believe that the Court's examination of the
service, rather than the exaction, led it down the wrong path.
We contend that in order to determine whether a tax falls
within the constitutional prohibition, the text of the Export
Clause and the cases indicate that courts should focus on
whether the exaction is tied to the export or the process of ex-
portation. A tax is tied to an export when it is calculated based
upon an attribute of the export or the exportation process.
Thus, a tax violates the Export Clause if placed upon a service
tied to the process of exportation via an attribute of the goods,
i.e., placed upon an insurance policy and measured by the value
of the goods.
The subjective approach put forth in Thames & Mersey was
left untouched in IBM. The dissent in IBM noted the Court's
failure to perform an analysis as to whether an exaction was
sufficiently tied to the process of exportation. In a footnote, the
Court's majority opinion avoided addressing the Thames &
Mersey misstep:
The Court has never held that the Export Clause prohibits only direct
taxation of goods in export transit. In Brown v. Maryland, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall expressed in dicta his skepticism that a federal occupa-
tional tax on exporters could pass scrutiny under the Export
Clause.... ("[Wiould government be permitted to shield itself from
the just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the
constitution would expose it, by saying that this was a tax on the per-
son, not on the article, and that the legislature had a right to tax oc-
cupations?"). In Fairbank, Hvoslef, and Thames & Mersey, we struck
down taxes that were not assessed directly on goods in export transit,
but which the Court found to be so closely related as to be effectively
a tax on the goods themselves. We have never repudiated that prin-
ciple, but neither have we ever carefully defined how we decide
whether a particular federal tax is sufficiently related to the goods or
their value to violate the Export Clause. To the extent the issue was
raised in the petition for certiorari, the Government failed to address
the issue in its brief on the merits and therefore has abandoned it.33'
330. The Court noted correctly that a tax on the marine policies was indeed
a tax upon exportation and distinguished it from a tax upon the goods them-
selves not imposed during the process of exportation. "It is manifest that we
are not called upon to deal with transactions which merely anticipate exporta-
tion, or with goods that are not in the course of being actually exported." Id.
(citations omitted).
331. United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855 n.3 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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Thus, although Justice Thomas's opinion appropriately rejected
the Import-Export Clause and Commerce Clause precedent to
limit the scope of the Export Clause, he declined to articulate
the complete scope of the Export Clause. Defining this scope
may have required the Court to reexamine its precedent in
Thames & Mersey. We would agree with the dissent in IBM
that such an exercise is essential.
The question whether the Export Clause applies to taxes on distinct
export-related services requires most of the same inquiries the ma-
jority undertakes: construing the text of the Export Clause, consider-
ing its history and purpose, and reviewing our precedents. It also re-
quires explicit reexamination of the reasoning of Thames &
Mersey... which the Government has asked us to overrule, in par-
ticular the idea that a tax on insurance premiums is a tax on the
goods. The last is the only step the Court refuses to take. 3 2
In effect, the IBM Court got half-way there. It rejected
precedents other than Export Clause precedent to limit the
scope of the Export Clause. Yet, it failed to positively define its
scope. Had it done so, we believe the Supreme Court would not
subsequently have needed to create the fiction of the user fee
exception in U.S. Shoe.
We suggest that the Court should have considered whether
the tax was sufficiently tied to the process of exportation or the
exports themselves, so as to be "laid on articles exported."
Thus, if the same tax were imposed on insurance premiums,
but calculated without connection to the value, size or quantity
of the underlying good (as in Pace), such a tax would not trigger
the Export Clause.
The tax in Pace, calculated without reference to the goods,
passes muster under the Export Clause not because it is a user
fee, but because it is not "laid on articles exported." The exac-
tion in Pace was not calculated with reference to any attribute
of the good or the process of exportation.333 By examining the
exaction, rather than the service provided, the U.S. Shoe Court
could have avoided the slippery slope of insulating collateral
export services without resorting to a Commerce Clause analy-
sis.
Just as it would be too broad to say that articles which may
at some time be exports should be free at all times of govern-
mental burden, the government is not required to refrain from
assessing all activities which may relate in some way to exports
332. Id. at 869 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
333. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
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or the process of exportation. Yet, Commerce Clause regula-
tions which impose permissible exactions, even in light of the
Export Clause, by definition will most often fall outside of the
text-based mandate of the Export Clause. Such burdens will
not be limited by the Export Clause in cases where they do not
fall upon the export, i.e., they are not calculated based upon an
attribute of the export or the process of exportation. Interest-
ingly, the Court in Thames & Mersey seemed to make this dis-
tinction. In distinguishing the tax on the marine insurance
policies from taxes on goods actually in the process of exporta-
tion, the Court stated that it was not concerned "in the present
case, with the taxation of the insurance business, as
such .... "334
Therefore, it is quite possible for an otherwise valid Com-
merce Clause exaction to be prohibited by the Export Clause.
Likewise, it is possible to construct a Commerce Clause exac-
tion which complies with the Export Clause. For example, if
the tax in U.S. Shoe were calculated based on the use of the
port rather than based on an attribute of the article exported, it
would not have offended the Export Clause prohibition. This
would be true even if such fees were either assessed by the gov-
ernment on the exporter, but calculated based on the use of the
port, or assessed by the government on the transport company
based on port use, but passed on by the transport company to
the exporter by a charge calculated based on an attribute of the
goods. In either case these valid user fees would not come
within the purview of the Export Clause because the fee im-
posed by the government would not have been "laid on articles
exported." Rather it would have been laid on port use, with
which the Export Clause has no quarrel.335 As discussed, the
concerns of the Framers and the principles they embodied in
the Export Clause relate to the hindrance of foreign trade re-
sulting from political manipulations. 336 Congress, in choosing
the method for placing burdens on exports, is subject to politi-
cal influence; this power for the government was a very specific
334. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 25.
335. Although port use is related to exportation, the limit of the Export
Clause prohibition may be drawn at some point. We suggest in this Article
that the limit should be drawn at the limit clearly suggested by the text and
precedent of the clause.
336. See MADISON, supra note 70, at 498-99.
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evil which the Framers envisioned, feared and sought to pre-
vent.33
7
Interestingly, at oral argument before the Supreme Court
in U.S. Shoe, the Deputy Solicitor General responded to the
complaint that an ad valorem tax, such as the HMT, was not a
user fee by stating that what he believed to be a true user fee
(one not based on value but on a fair approximation of use)
would actually be more of a burden on exports and therefore
contrary to the underlying policy of the Export Clause. Such a
true user fee would hinder exports, the government argued, be-
cause it would not be based upon the value of exports or their
profitability and therefore would be contrary to the purpose of
the Export Clause. Alternatively, the government argued that
the assessment was a user fee on port use, but that calculation
of a user fee necessarily involves approximation of the fees to
be charged. In this argument, the government claimed that the
ad valorem basis of calculation was merely the best method of
approximating the benefit received by the exporter from the
port use.338 Although these arguments may be enticing to
some, it is crucial to recognize that they do not address the
relevant issue, that is, whether the exaction undermines the
very interests the Framers sought to protect. The Framers did
not seek to preserve the least burdensome, most fair, or most
useful exactions on exports, they sought to prohibit all burdens
on articles exported. Any retrenchment from this position
threatens the principles embodied in the text of the clause.
CONCLUSION
Explicating the meaning of the Export Clause is important
to maintain the protection it provides even when that protec-
337. Arguably, the Framers specific concerns arose when Congress enacted
the HMT. In oral argument the U.S. Shoe Court remarked on Congress's fail-
ure to enact a tonnage rather than a value based tax. The Court's questioning
implied that Congress's choice may have been influenced by Senator Hatfield,
whom Justice Scalia remarked hailed from the timber state of Oregon. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523
U.S. 360 (1998) (No. 97-372), available in 1998 WL 102578, at *8-9 (Mar. 4,
1998).
338. This method would state that the most equitable way of allocating the
costs of port use is to those who benefit most from its service. Thus, exporters
with high value items derive more benefit from being able to transport and sell
their items than sellers of low value items. Apart from the constitutional ar-
guments we have presented, this position is disputable in that even accepting
this arguendo, benefit would still not be best measured based on the value of
the goods, but rather by profit margin.
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tion may sacrifice another worthy and otherwise constitutional
exaction. A workable explication began in IBM. IBM failed to
complete its task. The facts of U.S. Shoe did not require that
the Court continue IBM's work in order to reach the correct re-
sult in U.S. Shoe. As a result, U.S. Shoe mistakenly opened the
door for a user fee exception to the Export Clause. A user fee
exception to the Export Clause cannot be supported by prece-
dent. Moreover, it would have been better for the Court simply
to continue the explication process begun in IBM and set forth
a definition of what constitutes an Export Clause tax or duty,
instead of defining what constitutes a user fee exception to an
Export Clause tax or duty.
We believe that we have set forth a workable Export
Clause definition as an exaction which:
1) arises during the process of exportation; and
2) is calculated based upon the export or the process of
exportation.
The foregoing two-part test reflects the text of the Export
Clause, as well as its spirit. It is supported by the Export
Clause precedent and is consistent with other constitutional
provisions. Given the size of the taxpayer refunds estimated in
U.S. Shoe alone, it is certain that future Export Clause chal-
lenges will follow. We believe the foregoing analysis provides a
clear, workable and principled definition for such challenges.
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